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Introduction
Landis MacKeLLar  
racheL FriedMan
the FieLd oF popuLation studies that Population and Development Review serves 
has responded briskly to Covid-19, with webinars, virtual conferences, special 
issues, and more. Our attitude at PDR was to take a deep breath and a look 
around to see which way the wind blew.  
Now, of course, there has been ample time to know with confidence 
which way it blows: the Covid-19 crisis and its aftermath will be with us all 
around the world for many years to come. Implications for geopolitics, mac-
roeconomies, labor, financial, and commodity markets, the environment, 
technology and innovation, health care systems, gender, racial and ethnic 
inequality, and more will be profound and durable. As will effects on the core 
interests of demography: mortality, fertility, migration, urbanization, family 
and social structure, and the resulting implications for socioeconomic, envi-
ronmental, and technological regimes.    
Much peer-reviewed research on Covid-19 published in journals like 
PDR will take months or years to complete. Yet, it became increasingly clear 
to us in the weeks following the onset of the pandemic that we could offer an 
alternate kind of scholarly space to explore current and potential impacts of 
the virus, an essay space. So, we invited a group of recent PDR authors and 
Population Council researchers to respond to the following question: How do 
you see Covid-19 shaping global demographic research needs over the next 
five to ten years? We were rewarded with 16 wide-ranging essays covering 
much ground in few words. These thoughtful reflections offer a time capsule 
of sorts on current thinking in the field.   
Some common themes emerged: calls for more interdisciplinary col-
laboration and investment in high-quality data, for example, and reflections 
on demography’s role when it comes to issues of inequality and governance. 
Researchers’ interests are naturally revealed. While some focus on needs and 
opportunities in terms of data and analysis, others are concerned with future 
generations of demographers and their research priorities. There is some 
broad scope overlap, but each essay offers a distinct vantage point from which 
to view the future of demographic research. 
https://doi.org/10.31899/pdr1.1016
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Moving to specifics, a number of contributors call for better data, includ-
ing data from innovative sources and approaches. A particular impact cited 
is that Covid-19 has disrupted plans for the 2020 census round. There is a 
sentiment that demographers should see themselves not merely as produc-
ers of data consumed by researchers in related disciplines such as economics, 
sociology, and public health. Enhanced collaboration is a theme that runs 
throughout the contributions. Since Covid-19 is similar in certain ways to 
other adverse life events (illness, divorce, job loss) studied by family de-
mographers, the pandemic might also push the interdisciplinary life-course 
approach more firmly to the center of demography. Since the pandemic 
may undo decades of progress in advancing gender equality, its impact on 
reproductive health, even the structural shift toward lower fertility in many 
developing countries, deserves attention.  
The issue of research transparency as a strategy for combating the grow-
ing mistrust and politicization of science is raised. So, too, is the importance 
of comparative research, especially at the international level, to disentangle 
the effects of the disease itself from underlying social conditions and re-
sponses, not only in public health narrowly speaking, but in governance more 
broadly. There are issues of how statistics in our data-driven world are being 
interpreted through cognitive and moral frameworks, population-wide and 
at individual and personal levels. Demographers have a responsibility not 
only to help the public better understand and interpret the statistics being 
disseminated at a frantic pace, but also to reflect on how they themselves are 
affected by these data.  
While some contributors look outward—data needs, new methods 
of dealing with them—some look inward to reflect on the field itself. Who 
will be producing the needed demographic research? Gender gaps are likely 
emerging as the pandemic disproportionately affects women at the peak 
of their research productivity, and their students, with long-term impacts. 
International graduate study, heavily concentrated in the United States and 
Europe, is being disrupted. The global scope of research may narrow due to 
increased difficulty of fieldwork. As the need for field-based research grows, 
there is risk that it becomes more difficult and hence less attractive for re-
searchers starting out.
We look forward to revisiting the issues raised in these essays in the 
years to come, and to reevaluating their global impact on demography and 
demographers. Even more, we look forward to the day when the most acute 
and painful phase of this pandemic is behind us—when we can finally, fully 
exhale that deep breath.
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Coronavirus, Cohorts, and 
International Demography
Keera aLLendorF
in the short terM, the pandemic presents a profound period effect. In 2020, 
as the novel coronavirus spread and mortality rose, governments closed bor-
ders, public events evaporated, and economic hardship skyrocketed. Steep 
age effects of the pandemic were also rapidly apparent. The risk of dying of 
Covid-19 is dramatically higher among the elderly and especially low among 
young children.
Yet, when asked to consider how Covid-19 may shape future demo-
graphic research needs, my mind kept turning to cohort effects, the diagonal 
axis of demography’s time trio. I fear the pandemic will adversely shape the 
composition and research interests of cohorts of future demographers. Spe-
cifically, the pandemic may make upcoming cohorts of demographers more 
American and less likely to engage in international research, especially field-
work. In turn, future demographic research may become less comparative 
and more US-focused. 
Cohorts of demographers who experience the pandemic during gradu-
ate school may be pushed toward solely quantitative, US-based dissertations. 
US-origin students who study populations outside the US often complete 
mixed-methods dissertations with fieldwork components. The pandemic 
likely forced advanced students to stop fieldwork early and cancel upcoming 
fieldwork plans. Beginning graduate students may well decide planning and 
completing international fieldwork is too risky or practically impossible for 
the next few years. International travel funds and fellowships appear to be 
disappearing as budgets contract. Pre-dissertation trips to assess potential field 
sites may never occur. And, years-long processes of taking language classes 
may seem like a waste of precious time. Instead, graduate students may turn 
to the safer route of analyzing survey data collected in the US. Once solidified, 
this approach may persist long past graduate school.
Younger cohorts of Americans who may become demographers farther 
into the future are likely missing experiences that would motivate and pre-
Keera Allendorf, Department of Sociology, Indiana University.
https://doi.org/10.31899/pdr1.1000
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pare them to embark on international fieldwork later in life. The pandemic 
put many study-abroad trips, which undergraduates undertake within a brief 
window, on hold or out of financial reach. Entry-level jobs in organizations 
where college graduates gain international experience disappeared or shrank 
with pandemic-induced travel freezes and budget cuts. The pandemic moti-
vated many high school students to take gap years before college, but these 
breaks do not feature international travel. 
My fears are based on considering the counterfactuals of my own life as 
an emerging demographer. A foundational experience of my research is dis-
sertation fieldwork undertaken in 2007–08 in a village in India. That academic 
year depended on long-term planning, funding, and language classes, as well 
as an extra year of school spent waiting for a research visa, from 2002–07. 
Many experiences before graduate school were also instrumental. Working 
at the International Center for Research on Women in 2000–02, I made my 
first trip to India and learned of the existence of demography. Earlier, in 1998, 
a study-abroad program in Nepal provided inspiration for my dissertation 
research questions, as well as language and field experience. And as a teen-
ager, my interest in the region was galvanized by my sister’s time in Nepal 
as a Peace Corps Volunteer in 1992–94. If a pandemic had occurred in 1992, 
1998, 2000, or any point from 2002–08, I may never have gone to India for 
my dissertation and my research agenda may well have turned to the US.
Reflections on experiences of my colleagues who are not of US-origin 
suggests upcoming cohorts of demographers may also become more Ameri-
can. Since demography is not a staple of secondary schooling many of us 
encounter the discipline by accident as undergraduates or even graduate 
students. As a small field, demographers tend to be trained in a small number 
of universities, many of which are in the US. Many young people only en-
counter demography and become demographers if they attend one of these 
universities. With the pandemic, these universities are not sending staff on 
trips to recruit international students. Further, many prospective students 
may choose to stay close to home in the uncertain context of the pandemic 
or no longer have the finances to support schooling abroad. Inhospitable im-
migration policies of the US, which worsened in the pandemic, will also push 
international students away from American universities. And, for those who 
are farther along, the pandemic-induced collapse of the job market may be 
even more devastating for those who are not American citizens. These newly 
minted demographers require immediate academic jobs to stay in the US and, 
in some cases, stay in demography.  
Such cohort effects could reduce the quality of demographic research 
and theory for years to come. A scarcity of fieldwork will limit our under-
standing of demographic processes on the ground and our ability to build 
explanations of how and why these processes vary and change. Two decades 
ago, Knodel (1997) laid out a compelling case for the use of qualitative 
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methods for demographers, which remains equally relevant today. As he 
noted, when demographers themselves use qualitative methods the resulting 
research is especially dense with demographic insights. 
I want to highlight other longer-term, more hidden benefits of such 
work, though. Ethnographic observation and collection of less structured 
interviews allow—even force—researchers to be highly involved with the 
populations they study (Axinn and Pearce 2006). Such involvement leads to 
deeper understanding, which is invaluable when demographers study popula-
tions to which they do not belong. Reading is vital, but there is a more visceral 
understanding when reading is combined with on-the-ground experience. 
Such understanding stimulates new research questions and hypotheses, as 
well as better measures and modeling, when we use quantitative methods 
and data, sometimes years later. For instance, what I encountered during 
fieldwork resonated so strongly with developmental idealism theory that I 
devoted much of the last decade to assessing the influence of developmental 
idealism on demographic behavior.
One reason fieldwork is so generative is the analytical power of com-
parison. The deeper knowledge gained through fieldwork comes in part from 
comparison to other populations the researcher knows from personal experi-
ence. As social scientists we are informal ethnographers of the populations we 
live in—drawing inspiration and understanding from our own lives and those 
around us. Fieldwork inevitably includes ruminating on how and why life 
in the study population differs from home or a “reference” population. Like 
learning another language, such comparisons enable richer understanding 
of both contexts. It was only through learning to use postpositions in Nepali 
that I really understood prepositions in English. Similarly, comparisons of my 
Indian fieldwork to interactions with my husband’s family in Greece fueled 
insights into family demography. Parallels with Indian interviews helped me 
quickly grasp my Greek grandmother-in-law’s story of her arranged marriage. 
Yet, seeing this senior woman do all the cooking made me rethink genera-
tional dynamics of joint families. 
Fieldwork is not the only way demographers become involved with 
other populations, though. Living and working or attending school in another 
country is another way to gain such involvement. This link is one reason it 
is important future cohorts include demographers who are not from the US. 
Their ability to compare their current context to where they used to live also 
provides unique demographic insights and inspiration. When asked by a 
journalist about the motivation for work on Indian one-child families, Son-
alde Desai explained, “There is interesting work in the US on ways in which 
women combine career and motherhood by limiting themselves to a single 
child. I was surprised to see the number of people I saw around me [in the 
US] with a single child and wondered if the same processes might be operat-
ing in India” (Lopez 2020). 
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While I am concerned about adverse cohort effects, I am also heartened 
by new opportunities for international research presented by the pandemic. 
First, the normalization of online meetings and webinars may facilitate in-
ternational exchanges and collaborations. We are now adapted to traversing 
distances virtually. Seminar series and conferences may include occasional 
webinars with speakers “zooming in” from afar even when most events are 
in-person. The new practice of making recordings, as well as data and code, 
available online might even send demography into the hands (and ears) of 
future demographers located anywhere with a smartphone and an internet 
connection. 
Second, indirect effects of the pandemic may improve the balance of 
international comparisons. The surging Black Lives Matter movement in the 
US seems to have been aided in part by unsettling caused by the pandemic. 
There is new recognition of the importance of Black scholars and scholarship 
on race in demography and other fields. This heightened energy around di-
versity may extend beyond racial hierarchies within the US to international 
hierarchies as well. While demography is more international than many 
disciplines, there is a lingering US orientation. Publishing on India and Ne-
pal, reviewers often exhort me to justify the study location and discuss the 
relevance of the findings to the US. By contrast, the importance of the US is 
often taken for granted and authors of US studies are not usually pushed to 
address the relevance of their findings to other places. 
I hope a broad view of diversity motivates us to decenter the US, rather 
than abandoning comparisons. Pressure from reviewers to make comparisons 
benefited my research. Considering precisely how and why processes we are 
studying in one population differ from those in others is exactly the type of 
theory-building work demographers should engage in. It is the US orienta-
tion that could be rebalanced. Comparisons to the US are often useful, but in 
many cases comparisons to other populations are more instructive. And, even 
when studying the US, we should consider how our findings fit into theories 
of how and why demographic processes unfold in a broader global landscape. 
Before closing, I want to address two incongruities in these reflections. 
Ironically, while pointing to the value of decentering the US, I focused these 
reflections on the US. This orientation is no accident. It is US demography 
that seems most at risk of these adverse cohort effects and most in need of 
international perspectives. Americans must go a long way to gain substantial 
international experience and many never do so. Further, many demographers 
working and training in the US are located within sociology departments. 
Sociology’s strong US focus seeps into demography. 
The US also plays an outsize role in demography as the base of many 
demographers, as well as leading demography journals. A comparison of the 
relative size of professional associations provides a rough measure of this 
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outsize role. In 2021, the Population Association of America (PAA) is nearly 
twice as large as the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 
(IUSSP) and four times larger than the European Association for Population 
Studies (EAPS). According to their respective websites, PAA has over 3,000 
members, IUSSP’s membership stands at 1,600, and EAPS has just under 700.
Finally, while I hope our tradition of an international, comparative 
demography persists well beyond the pandemic, I also want to emphasize 
that populations do not map neatly onto national borders. Often, the farther 
from home we go, the more different things are, and the more we learn. We 
do not always have to venture to another country though. Even in the US, 
traveling to another region, or sometimes just down the street, can enmesh 
one in a different demographic reality.
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Covid-19 Global Demographic 
Research Needs? Replacing 
Speculative Commentaries 
with Robust Cross-national 
Comparisons
eva Beaujouan
the WorLd is currently undergoing a pandemic-induced crisis transforma-
tive of human needs and behaviors. How can demographers contribute to 
understanding Covid-19 and its consequences? Disparities between countries, 
and social, gender, and economic inequalities within them, were present well 
before the crisis and long studied by demographers. Covid-19 presents demo-
graphic researchers with a renewed and enhanced opportunity to contribute 
to the fight against inequality. Demographers can assist countries in their re-
coveries over forthcoming years by collecting, compiling, and analyzing data 
on how the crisis unfolded, generating knowledge about changes in social 
and individual behaviors and adjustments in the population, and identifying 
what triggered them. Highlighting how the crisis and policy responses to it 
affected people may help policymakers better promote resilience and pre-
pare for future crises—assuredly the next disease crisis, but also notably the 
climate emergency as well. In this comment, I argue that the Covid-19 crisis 
has increased the need for international comparisons, and hence for better 
comparative data.
Why Do We Need International Comparisons?
Cross-country studies are central to understanding demographic processes, 
and frameworks dear to demographers such as the demographic and epi-
demiological transitions, and Esping-Andersen’s welfare state classification, 
could not have been developed without comparative data. Such studies al-
low unraveling the mechanisms that underpin macro-level trends and inter-
Eva Beaujouan, University of Vienna (Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 
[IIASA, OeAW, Univ. Vienna]).
https://doi.org/10.31899/pdr1.1001
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country disparities, but they are time- and data-intensive. Despite a surge in 
comparative Covid-19 mortality studies (Dudel et al. 2020; Esteve et al. 2020; 
Kontis et al. 2020), such comparisons are likely to be underrepresented in 
most explorations of the consequences of the pandemic, particularly in those 
that focus on the role of socioeconomic factors, as well as on processes that 
are difficult to quantify such as migration and union dynamics. The challenges 
are compounded by the fact that these processes require data on individual 
characteristics and contextual variables as well as measurement of the de-
mographic outcomes. 
The crisis affects society at different levels, and beyond the health aspect 
it has important economic and social effects that vary by country. The illness 
and Covid-associated “lockdowns” (one of the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
Words of the Year for 2020, borrowed from American prison argot) have, 
directly or indirectly, led to an explosion in unemployment, precarity, and 
economic uncertainty, and a deepening of social, gender, or ethnic inequali-
ties (Copley et al. 2020; Farré et al. 2020; Lambert et al. 2020; Magnusson et 
al. 2020; Reichelt et al. 2020). Depending on the prevalence of the virus in 
the country and on the response, a significant share of persons are suffering 
mental and physical health issues associated with Covid-19, the lockdowns, 
and uncertainty (Xiong et al. 2020). 
If research is confined to the most-affected countries, the richest coun-
tries, or countries with the best data, this can lead to a biased perception of the 
impact of Covid-19. Aassve et al. (2020) expect very different consequences 
of the crisis for fertility depending on the world area, and particularly its 
socioeconomic development. The same way, migration and health long-
term impact will probably vary depending on the country. Countries have 
not been evenly exposed to the pandemic, they differ in social organization 
and demographic structure, and have not reacted in the same way. Results 
derived from a single context would thus likely lead to a misunderstanding 
of the crisis and its consequences. 
Cross-national comparative studies to understand the impact of dif-
ferences in culture, preparedness, and policy responses are particularly dif-
ficult to implement because of the diversity of the units of analysis at least 
at three levels: economic and cultural diversity, demographic variation, and 
data comparability between countries. World areas are at different levels of 
development, and also within areas, variations occur, linked, for instance to 
the political and welfare regime. Countries’ demographic characteristics vary 
according to their stage of the demographic transition, but even at similar 
stages, differences in culture, economy, and health system lead (among oth-
ers) to different family structure and fertility levels, migration mechanisms, 
and life expectancy. And finally, there is a large inconsistency in data available 
across the world but also in very similar countries. 
Despite, but also because of, these challenges, a set of robust, compara-
tive observations across multiple countries is needed to allow countries to 
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assess the success of their short- and long-term responses, relative to other 
countries, in achieving wanted results in the face of the crisis while avoiding 
unwanted ones. They can reveal structural regularities—whether of demo-
graphic, social, or governance dimension—with meaningful implications for 
policy (Kontis et al. 2020). This implies carefully taking the above-mentioned 
considerations into account. Notably, to tailor the studies to analyze a small 
sample of countries that are credible comparators, for instance regional com-
parative studies; to implement the analyses taking into account the demo-
graphic structure and welfare regime by isolating shared and country-specific 
features; but above all, to increase the capacity to collect and disseminate 
comparative data.
Toward Comparative Studies on Fertility and 
Family in the High-Income Countries
I pursue with examples how studies of fertility and family in the high-income 
countries would benefit from international comparisons and data. During 
the short- and medium-term crisis, suddenly altered circumstances probably 
lead to fertility postponement. This would result from the adverse economic 
situation, uncertainty about what the future holds, changes in partnership 
dynamics due notably to closure of social venues, decreased sexual activity 
(documented in several high-income countries), and more uneven access 
to health care and Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART). On the other 
hand, more difficult access to abortion and to contraception in some settings, 
as well as an increase in intimate partner sexual coercion and assault may 
trigger a rise in unwanted births following the lockdowns. Preliminary find-
ings on fertility intentions in the initial phase of the pandemic point to a birth 
recession in the high-income countries, but the extent of such a downturn 
in fertility is likely to vary across contexts (Lindberg et al. 2020; Luppi et al. 
2020). In addition, as conditions ease, lagging economic recovery, delay in 
leaving the parental home, weakened intentions to have children, as well as 
having reached the biological age limit for fertility or no longer being able to 
pay for ART, can lead to an inability to recuperate lost fertility. Country condi-
tions will probably determine to which extent the downward blip on fertility 
will be made up as societies return to a pre-pandemic norm. To observe these 
various aspects, local specialized studies will be very useful, but to generalize 
them, comparative studies are needed. 
Research on the family consequences of Covid-19 has started, but it is 
scattered across different countries and suffers from a lack of data (Guetto et 
al. 2020; Relationships Australia 2020; Wagner et al. 2020; Wilde et al. 2020). 
As in the case of employment and mortality (Drefahl et al. 2020; ECDC 2020), 
the crisis may more strongly affect already-disadvantaged people, because 
they are more likely to experience economic hardship and this increases the 
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likelihood of separation and the transition to a single-parent family. Younger 
generations, already at a particular disadvantage compared to their parents, 
may see their situation worsen: delayed family formation, fragilized romantic 
relationships, “boomerang” return to parents’ residence, school- or university 
dropout. Family organization particularly suffered during the lockdowns, 
mostly due to the erosion of hard-won improvements in the gender division 
of labor in the home and women leaving the labor force to care for children. 
They will find it hard to get back in. Finally, reduced ART access and the lack 
of time to catch up on postponed births mentioned above may reinforce the 
inability of women with a high level of education to have all the children 
they originally wanted. 
Overall, we can propose tentative theories and we have the know-how 
to study the consequences of the crisis for fertility and the family (and I think 
that we can generalize this to other aspects of demographic behavior). How-
ever, to understand what underlies changing family dynamics in the age of 
Covid-19, we need to set these studies in their international context, and for 
this we need data. 
Data Needs and Data Resources
Beside drawing attention to wide cultural and structural variations between 
countries, for demographers the crisis has underlined the preexisting differ-
ences in data availability. Countries in which register data linked to other 
administrative datasets are available are best placed to conduct advanced 
studies of the impact of Covid-19 on the population. Other countries are 
critically short of data and have not been able to conduct surveys specific to 
the Covid-19 period, which will lead to a severe lack of information on the 
impact of the virus. 
Data useful to study the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic vary 
in nature. Repeat surveys, retrospective surveys, and population registers 
are useful to observe breaks in trends during the crisis and variations across 
countries, even without adding Covid-specific questions. Purpose-designed 
surveys with a few questions related to the pandemic (for instance change in 
economic situation, in fertility plans, in health), as well as panel studies fol-
lowing individual situations, can bring additional information about the short-
term consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, and be asked across multiple 
countries. In addition, cross-country population surveys can be adapted by 
adding Covid-specific questions during or after the pandemic. Such surveys 
have the advantage of having an existing set of core questions that identify 
individual and household characteristics (e.g., social status, level of education, 
birth histories); alongside which, details about the pandemic can be explored. 
Finally, digital data also have a large potential to bring insights on the crisis.
12  c o v i d -19  g L o B a L  d e M o g r a p h i c  r e s e a r c h  n e e d s ?
In light of this, the need to strengthen cross-national data infrastructure 
for integrating data from different types of sources, registers, as well as surveys 
is becoming more pressing. The Human Mortality Database helps monitor 
excess deaths across the high-income countries with its Short-term Mortality 
Fluctuations data series, and INED has developed a database on the Demog-
raphy of Covid-19 Deaths by age and sex (https://dc-covid.site.ined.fr/en/) in 
response to the pandemic. Other consequences of Covid-19 across countries 
may be observed later via the Human Fertility Database, IPUMS-international 
that provides micro census data, and the IMAGE project that has assembled 
comparative statistics on internal migration (www.imageproject.com.au). But 
such data are not sufficient to compare social inequalities, for which detailed 
individual data with a uniform survey design across countries are necessary. 
Population surveys that belong to the Generation and Gender Programme 
and SHARE offer core demographic questions common to a range of high-
income countries, and together with studies with smaller samples such as the 
World Value Surveys or European Social Survey they will be very valuable, 
especially if they ask pandemic-related questions. Register data linked to ad-
ministrative data could be made available for use in more countries, but this 
requires working further on the legal and institutional framework of making 
such data available for research (FORS and inkhub.ch 2020). Availability and 
distribution of international data have advanced in the last two decades, but 
we still lack a central repository, or even a definitive source of advice on the 
availability of comparative data that would provide a foundation for inter-
national projects and facilitate the development of international research. 
Conclusion: Further Develop Robust, Cross-
Nationally Comparative Datasets
The overarching research agenda of demographic research may not change 
much: trying to improve the living conditions of people across the planet by 
helping societies “understand and anticipate the population dynamics they are 
experiencing” (UNFPA 2020, p. 2). With this crisis, we have stronger reasons 
and incentives to carry it through. Demographers have been working for a 
long time with epidemiologists, geographers, economists, sociologists, repro-
ductive health specialists, and so forth. Uniting further with other disciplines 
that bring their skills, perspectives, and data would help to answer the needs 
emerging from the crisis, and facilitate clear and timely communication of 
results. For demographers to most effectively bring their insights to bear on 
Covid-19, however, we need to intensify our efforts to develop robust, cross-
nationally comparative datasets that extend beyond our traditional focus on 
simple summary indicators of births and deaths. 
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Who Is Doing the Research? 
The Implications of the 
Pandemic for Researchers in 
the Population Sciences
ann K. BLanc 
sanyuKta Mathur 
stephanie r. psaKi
as the gLoBaL Covid-19 pandemic reaches the one-year mark, its impact on 
those who carry out research in the population sciences1 is beginning to be 
revealed. Even in the first few months of the pandemic, observers began to 
suggest that the main indicators of research productivity were showing signs 
of change. One change was a widening of an existing gender disparity (Krapf 
et al. 2016; Thomas et al. 2019) as female researchers in a range of social 
sciences, the natural sciences, and medicine submitted fewer papers for pub-
lication, deposited fewer manuscripts in preprint repositories, and registered 
fewer new projects (Flaherty 2020b; Muric´ et al. 2020; Viglione 2020). Such 
is the level of concern that the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineer-
ing, and Medicine has undertaken a “fast track” study sponsored by U.S. gov-
ernment agencies and private foundations on the early effects of the Covid-19 
pandemic on the careers of women in academic science, engineering, and 
medicine (National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine 2020). 
Statistical analyses of early data on authorship of published manuscripts 
and preprints demonstrate the same basic result—women are falling further 
behind men in this measure of research productivity (Fredrickson 2020; 
Vincent-Lamarre et al. 2020). For example, one study of more than 40,000 
preprints in the social sciences showed that between March and May 2020, 
while total preprints increased by 35 percent, male researchers were respon-
sible for most of that increase; preprints submitted by female researchers 
dropped by 13.2 percent relative to male researchers in the United States. 
The analysis also found that the relative decrease in female productivity was 
greater for assistant professors (vs. post docs and senior professors) and for 
those in top-ranked universities (vs. lower-ranked universities).
Ann K. Blanc, Sanyukta Mathur, Stephanie Psaki, Population Council (Ann Blanc, formerly Popula-
tion Council).
https://doi.org/10.31899/pdr1.1002
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Similar results were observed in six additional countries (Cui et al. 
2020). This result appears to be the case for both new research papers related 
to Covid-19 as well as to research more generally (Amano-Patiño et al. 2020; 
Bittante et al. 2020; Pinho-Gomes et al. 2020). In Population and Development 
Review (PDR), overall submissions in 2020 were up by 26 percent compared 
to 2019. This phenomenon has become common in scholarly journals across 
disciplines (Dolan and Lawless 2020; Flaherty 2020a; Rasul 2020), including 
demography2 (Hayward 2020). At the same time, there is some evidence of 
a widening gender difference in submissions by sex in the international pool 
of researchers who submit to PDR; male first or sole authors of submissions to 
PDR exceed those of females by about 45 percent during the period January 
2019–March 2020 (226 and 156 submissions, respectively) and 57 percent 
during April–December 2020 (170 and 108 submissions) (Figure 1).3 Submit-
ted papers generally represent the result of many months or years of work, 
and—even for work already in progress—the process of finalizing a paper for 
submission to a journal requires a concentrated (and ideally, uninterrupted) 
period of time in front of a computer.
Why has female research productivity, and leadership in research prod-
ucts, faltered during this global crisis? The existence of gender disparities, 
which predated the Covid-19 pandemic, is generally attributed to the exac-
erbation of existing inequalities within and outside the workplace. Within US 
higher education institutions for instance, women make up only 31 percent 
of full-time faculty and at four-year institutions women represent just 27 
percent of tenured faculty (Kelly 2019). When these data are examined by 
race/ethnicity, the disparities are even more stark (Hur et al. 2017). Addi-
tional research shows gender differences in the distribution of research and 
FIGURE 1     Submissions to Population and Development Review by sex of 
first/sole author (2019–2020)
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nonresearch time and roles for male versus female faculty (Mitchell and Hesli 
2013; Babcock et al. 2017; Guarino and Borden 2017; O’Meara et al. 2017). 
A study with over 6,000 associate and full professors across 13 US universi-
ties using a time-use diary approach found that female faculty spent more 
time than their male counterparts on campus/institutional service, student 
advising, and teaching-related activities and received additional pressure at 
the same time to become involved in further teaching, student advising, and 
professional service (O’Meara et al. 2017). 
Given these existing patterns, it is perhaps not surprising that gender 
gaps in research productivity have grown in the midst of a global crisis. 
Over the last year, both anecdotal and emerging research are showing that 
women have taken on more caregiving responsibilities (of children, parents, 
or other family members), compared to men. Women with young children 
in particular report fewer available working hours (Krukowski et al. 2020). 
As women expand their caregiving responsibilities (often during the work-
day, for instance to support children with virtual schooling) and meet their 
nonnegotiable work responsibilities (e.g., classes that must be taught, fund-
raising deadlines that must be met), they may be unable to protect their scant 
research time. These disparities may be further compounded among those 
who are more junior in their fields, with limited access to mentors and fewer 
opportunities for networking—both key elements for establishing productive 
research collaborations. More junior researchers may also have less flexibility 
to decline or reduce nonresearch tasks than their senior counterparts. 
While the short- and medium-term impacts of the pandemic on the 
productivity and careers of established researchers may be increasingly com-
ing to light, it is much less clear what the longer-term impact will be on the 
trajectory of those who have newly entered the field of population sciences 
or who seek training at the graduate level. Beyond growing gender disparities 
in publication, the pandemic is likely to reshape the population sciences field 
in numerous ways, including the geographic representation, international 
experience, and areas of focus for new researchers. Funding for graduate 
training in the population sciences (and disciplines within it) has fluctuated 
over the last few decades but potential students from low- and middle-income 
countries have been especially affected as earlier dedicated sources of graduate 
funding from the United Nations, governments, and other funding institu-
tions in high-income countries have shrunk or shifted to other fields (Menken 
et al. 2002; Hur et al. 2017). As was the case early in the HIV epidemic, the 
Covid pandemic could shift funding toward training for epidemiology, public 
health, as well as population sciences research that contributes to tracking, 
modeling, and monitoring the pandemic (and its probable successors) as well 
as toward research that examines its social and economic effects. A multitude 
of examples of the contributions that population sciences research can make 
to the pandemic response have already been published (see IUSSP 2020).
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There have been numerous accounts in the popular media of the pre-
dicaments faced by international students who have been stranded or oth-
erwise negatively affected by pandemic-related university and government 
policies (Dickerson 2020; Fox 2020). In the long run, it is not clear what this 
will mean for training of population scientists at the global level but, at a mini-
mum, it seems likely to delay the completion of training for the current cohort 
of students, possibly curtail the admission of new students temporarily, and, 
depending on the course of the pandemic and the evolution of policies and 
funding, may influence the decisions of students about where to get training. 
For early-career researchers in the population sciences—graduate stu-
dents, post-docs, those in first jobs—fieldwork experience is often seen as a 
useful qualification leading to subsequent success in publishing, funding, and 
employment. With the pandemic indefinitely limiting or modifying the type 
of in-person survey and other data collection work that forms the basis of 
much population research (as well as severely restricting travel), the oppor-
tunities for young researchers to gain this experience safely may be limited. 
At the same time, there may be opportunities to contribute to methodologi-
cal advances in new and modified ways of collecting population information 
(White et. al 2020) and to conduct research on important emerging questions 
related to the consequences of the pandemic on various population groups.  
While current concerns about the pandemic are most salient, it is also 
worth noting the potential longer-term impacts that the Covid-19 pandemic 
may have on education and employment opportunities for young people in 
the US and around the world. Results from the first full school term during 
the Covid-19 pandemic in the US reveal dramatic increases in the propor-
tion of students with failing grades around the country—representing both 
poor performance and lack of participation. A recent national assessment of 
learning during Covid-19 (Kuhfeld et al. 2020) found that students in grades 
3–8 performed similarly to students in those grades in 2019, but about 5 to 10 
points lower in math than students in 2019. Students in older grades tended 
to do a bit better in maintaining performance relative to 2019 than students 
in lower grades, reflecting older students’ ability to work independently out-
side of school. However, the report is missing data on 25 percent of students 
included in 2019, who are predominantly low-income Black and Hispanic 
students, and also most likely to be disadvantaged by remote learning. The 
longer-term effects of these shifts on access to higher education, especially 
among the most affected groups, remain to be seen, but may well change the 
distribution of adults receiving a graduate education in the future.
Yet the effects of Covid-19 on education prospects are not limited to the 
countries that have been hard-hit by the pandemic to date. The World Bank 
has estimated that school closures in response to Covid-19—which occurred 
in many countries reporting few confirmed cases—will shave off 0.6 years 
of schooling for children worldwide, and that an additional seven million 
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young people will drop out of school due to Covid-19 (Azevedo et al. 2020), 
on top of the millions who were out of school already (UNESCO 2020). In 
terms of the effects on learning, the Education Commission estimates that 
an additional 10 out of every 100 school-aged children will enter “learning 
poverty” as a result of the pandemic, meaning they will be out of school, or 
they will remain in school but unable to read a basic text (Save our Future 
2020). As is often the case in times of crisis, those likely to be most affected 
are young people who were at a greater disadvantage to begin with, such as 
girls living in poor households and rural communities.
While the effects of the pandemic on the work of researchers in popula-
tion science and other scientific disciplines may be of minor importance in 
comparison to its disastrous health and economic effects, the year 2020 has 
laid bare a host of painful realities faced by researchers that are in need of 
documentation and analysis. Further, effectively rebuilding after this crisis will 
require creative sustained effort from many fields—including the population 
sciences—and those efforts will be most effective if they are undertaken by a 
broad and diverse group of researchers, including those most affected by this 
crisis. There are challenges facing all population researchers but the issues 
may differentially affect women, parents of young children, early career re-
searchers, those who work in hard or soft funding environments, and those 
working in particular countries or regions. As US-based researchers who work 
internationally, we acknowledge that our perspective is influenced by our 
own experience confronting multiple national crises over the last year, and 
that the perspective of researchers from other countries or regions is likely to 
be different. Nevertheless, a minimum step that would be universally benefi-
cial would be to gain a better understanding of who is contributing to popula-
tion science. This could be achieved by improving and standardizing the col-
lection and reporting of data on journal submissions, publications, manuscript 
reviews, participation in conference panels (Lange 2020), and other markers 
of research productivity by sex and other characteristics, such as geographic 
location, race/ethnicity, and career stage. Observers of recent events have also 
recommended a critical examination of institutional childcare leave policies, 
of time spent on research vs. other activities such as fundraising, mentoring, 
and institutional service (Myers et al. 2020), of stigma related to spending 
time on caregiving activities (Gewin 2020), and work-life balance and mental 
well-being of researchers (Raabe et al. 2020).
While there are numerous negative consequences of the pandemic, 
there are also glimmers of improvement for researchers related to increased 
flexibility in work hours and reductions in commuting time due to working 
at home. Some donors in the population sciences have allowed grantees to 
repurpose funds to accommodate changing conditions or granted extensions 
and/or additional funds for urgent Covid-related research. Further, training 
and experience in the population sciences may be an increasingly valuable 
20  W h o  i s  d o i n g  t h e  r e s e a r c h ?
asset for understanding the dimensions of current and future dilemmas, es-
pecially if researchers are intentional about producing and communicating 
results that are useful for policymakers and other stakeholders4 (Donaldson 
2011). Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic may offer an opportunity for those 
with a stake in the future of the population sciences to take action to address 
long-neglected challenges that are unlikely to be resolved quickly or without 
substantial effort and agreement on needed actions.
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A Covid Agenda from the 
Perspective of Adolescent 
Girls and Young Women
judith Bruce
iF i had Been asKed to write this commentary a year ago (December 2019), 
I would have offered the same top-line messages about the demographic 
agenda, focusing on a core constituency for that agenda—adolescent girls 
and young women in the poorest countries and communities. Applying De-
cember 2020 hindsight—no pun intended—these areas of inquiry hold, even 
though they are selectively amplified and reshaped by Covid. To understand 
what is unfolding before our eyes requires an unsparing inquiry from a post-
Covid perspective. We must track not only traditional impacts, but ask what 
strategies and programs/projects mitigated negative impacts and promoted 
positive ones. The needed research can be very roughly sorted into individual, 
household, and community levels, with considerable overlaps and linkages 
among the three. Priority for the research investment should be accorded to 
the populations most excluded and at risk pre-Covid.
The first impact of the pandemic worthy of study is its effect on the fe-
male dependency burden—not the conventional age-structure dependency 
burden, but the already disproportionate share of food and water provision-
ing, schooling, and physical-care responsibilities falling on females. Is the 
pandemic intensifying and redefining the burden? And on which females? A 
high and rising proportion of females can expect to be sole or majority provid-
ers for themselves, their children and grandchildren, and their parents and 
grandparents. Even when males are present and contributing, female income 
to a far greater extent than male income is “family income.” If current pat-
terns hold post-Covid, resources and income under female control will have 
many times the family impact of comparable income under male control 
and, therefore, increasing females’ economic inclusion should be prioritized.
Girls’ exercise of sexual and reproductive rights requires more than 
information and service access. They, like male peers, must have viable 
economic choices and an identity independent of sexuality, marriage, and 
Judith Bruce, Population Council.
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childbearing. Key to this is preparation for decent livelihoods, which can be 
measured by proxies such as completed schooling, mastery of basic finan-
cial and digital skills, incubator savings, and the social networks on which 
livelihoods often depend. Girls’ acquisition of such assets promotes deferred 
marriage and planned fertility; reduces the risk of STIs, including HIV/AIDS; 
and increases intergenerational investment in children’s health and educa-
tion. How will the dislocations of the pandemic—not only school disruption, 
but also girls’ visible economic response in this emergency—affect girls’ self-
identification as economic actors in their life-course and reproductive aspira-
tions? And, just as vitally, will there be a public appreciation of their burden 
and promise, which translates into increased investment in their economic 
inclusion? In the poorest communities pre-Covid, girls’ completion of sec-
ondary school was already at risk. During Covid, an all-girls school drawing 
students from a deprived rural Tanzanian district reported that the majority 
of the 300 girls returning to school post-confinement had not had the time 
nor facilities required to complete their “remote” studies. Most had been 
absorbed in survival caring and provisioning at home and some were sent 
to work the land (less true of their brothers). A network of school graduate 
mentors overseeing “girls’ clubs” in home communities feared that mentees 
in the public system, in which post-confinement had extended school by two 
hours, would be under pressure to drop out given their role backstopping the 
family survival strategy.
The pandemic may further alter the “shape” of girls’ lives, which is 
markedly different than that of boys. Girls’ biological puberty is earlier 
(approximately age 12) than that of boys; girls’ age of socially constructed 
“puberty” is often even younger in some traditional settings and many “mod-
ern” ones—owing to sexualizing norms promoted by social media. Girls’ 
reproductive health, social, and economic trajectories are largely set by age 
15. For males, not only is biological puberty later, but its consequences more 
favorable—their lives are getting better, their mobility greater, their share 
of everything (including power) increased. Girls’ resilience is tested in early 
adolescence, and few poor girls have an orderly transition to adulthood as 
per the policy nostrum life course—have adequate food, have vaccinations, 
enter school, complete school, find employment, select life partner, start a 
family, remain securely married. The observance of this script is a privilege 
for both males and females, but far rarer for deprived females. A longitudinal 
dataset from Malawi revealed that females were ten times more likely than 
male peers to undergo a major “transition”—leaving school, sexual initiation, 
marriage, becoming a parent, moving household, etc., between the ages of 
16 and 19. We need to study the impacts of the pandemic on events—leav-
ing school, labor and sexual exploitation, household displacement, etc., that 
have the potential to move girls off-track permanently. And, from a response 
point of view, what types of programs—and timing beginning at what age—
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can prevent the worst outcomes and offer second chances to those who have 
already fallen behind?
Females’ sexual, marriage, and labor markets are already harmfully 
intertwined and possibly further complicated by Covid conditions. Females’ 
sexual exposure rises in crisis, when sex may be included in the price of sur-
vival goods. Displacement/confinement-driven “marriages” increase the risk 
of unsafe pregnancy, and for many young mothers solo lifetime responsibility 
for children. Such marriages, even when they provide a temporary sense of 
protection, may simply defer risk to the young bride. They can be both un-
stable and unsafe, owing to a lack of meaningful consent, the haste of their 
conclusion, and mobility pressures on one or both partners to secure work 
and food. Campaigns to end child marriage in South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa report setbacks under Covid as destitute parents see marrying off a 
young daughter as an emergency poverty-alleviation response. Research 
questions include how the countervailing pressures on families to preserve 
adolescent females’ marriageability and family reputation, while also having 
an urgent need for survival income, are (were) resolved under Covid. What 
are (were) the results for girls’ marriage timing, partner selection, pressure 
for children, and marital stability?
The lives of the girls and young women central to this commentary are 
strongly conditioned by household demands. Household size and composi-
tion and how the “family” is socially constructed and its rules for allocating 
labor and food resources are vital information for demographic assessments 
and the design of relief and recovery efforts. Local meanings of household 
“headship” must be closely interrogated, lest this role be mechanically as-
signed to the oldest male, even if he is seldom home and it is the females who 
are bringing in most resources. When households are entitled to support, 
whether in kind or cash or access to services, how is it optimally delivered 
into complex households? Distribution of food during the rehabilitation phase 
of the Biafran crisis was encumbered by insufficient understanding of who 
was responsible for feeding whom. Malnourished children were not always 
the responsibility of their biological mothers, but of the female partners of 
their fathers. Households readily adapt when stressed by external shocks. In 
many deprived settings, new shocks—such as Covid—compound and extend 
old ones. In the Sahel, afflicted by long-term environmental degradation, 
drought, and endemic conflict, large nominally male-headed compounds 
are often composed of multiple female-centered families with each female in 
charge of provisioning her “cooking pot” dependents. 
Household power relations can be disrupted by Covid confinement. Men 
spending more time at home, accompanied by reports of escalating domestic 
violence, has turned attention to the relations between adult partners—but 
there are other power relations to investigate. A field report from Kenya re-
layed a provisional finding of more shared decision-making over resources 
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under Covid. Perhaps, but plausibly, female partners permit power-sharing 
to make peace and compensate for lost control by allocating more work to 
younger females. An interesting question will be how, under Covid confine-
ment conditions, adolescent girls’ labor, fertility, sexuality, and claim on food 
figure into household bargaining between adult partners. To what extent do 
females shift the burden of provisioning and caregiving among themselves 
rather than challenge the privilege and leisure of older and younger males?
On a brighter note, it will be worth examining how Covid can (from 
the strategy and program/project design point of view) or did (from the les-
sons learned point of view) open up new livelihood opportunities for young 
females. Covid has increased likely durable demand for locally available, af-
fordable, nutritious food and potable water; primary health care; safer, more 
comfortable multipurpose homes; low-cost renewable energy, and reliable 
digital connectivity for work, technical, and in-person learning aids. But, if 
these new opportunities materialize, can or will they be seized safely? Increas-
ing home-based work in poor settings accommodates childcare and home 
schooling, but generates little income, can reduce female control over earn-
ings, and may raise tensions with partners. Traditional work in community 
fields or marketplaces, though not risk-free, is conducted in familiar locations 
with some protective mechanisms. Post-Covid, better-paid work in modern-
izing sectors may entail mobility, new personalities, and places to navigate 
and skills to master—but also incur high safety and sexual risks.  
Finally, it is important to study Covid at the community level as crises 
illuminate and intensify preexisting divisions. Information about community 
substructures is vital to craft responses that strengthen social cohesion, chan-
nels of communication, and competence in delivering core services. Pre-Covid 
conventional community-engagement strategies, including “youth mobiliza-
tion,” convened forums, curated “dialogues,” and delivered resources in ways 
that tended to reinforce male dominance and formal control over community 
facilities and grant males preferential access to new technologies. Female 
leadership (where it existed) was token, and few avenues were provided for 
the expression of the needs of younger females or poorer households with 
children.
The learning opportunity—analytic and programmatic—of defining 
meaningful access to valued resources for different demographic segments 
cannot be overstated. Neither communities nor girls in the same communi-
ties are homogeneous. Rapid Covid responses have assumed sufficient—if 
not uniform—connectivity to render remote health and schooling support 
effective. Yet, in urban Ethiopia, girls in domestic service had negligible (and 
not private) phone access. In contrast, in Mozambique, an adolescent girls 
initiative with just weeks of experience in a new site had created enough 
social capital that neighbors lent phones to girls to receive Covid protection 
instructions and coordinate drop-off of food and hygienic supplies and home-
learning lesson plans. In places where girls have more cell phone coverage 
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they may have enhanced access to protection protocols and remote social 
support but are also subject to sexual messaging and trafficking. 
The delineation of communities into segments may require refinement 
to see pre- and post-Covid “transitions” more clearly. Standard cohort seg-
mentation may not serve; for example, girls 10 to 14 may be more usefully 
divided into girls 10 to 12 and 13 to 14 given the demographic significance 
of puberty and transition to secondary school. In some settings, classifying 
females not simply by their age but also by the age of the children for which 
they are responsible might be instructive. Once segmentation has been con-
textualized, we can explore for each segment what is “their” safe access to 
core resources (e.g., food security, water, health care), “their” time use, and 
“their” community of information (how and from whom “they” share infor-
mation, what information is trusted and actionable). There may be segment-
specific mental health impacts of Covid conditions. Psychological traumas 
may rob the young of their resilience, even when external factors improve. 
Younger females may be especially subject to depression, withdrawal, and a 
loss of the confidence needed to resist religious authoritarianism and demean-
ing gender roles.
That said, and equally worthy of study, there are shining examples in 
the context of Covid and other emergencies of young female cadres function-
ing as frontline “social first responders.” Female mentors and their adoles-
cent mentees have provided rapid responses to food insecurity, shaped and 
updated Covid protection messages, met reproductive health needs with 
privacy, interceded in medical emergencies and domestic violence, assisted 
community-wide at-home learning through virtual platforms, and delivered 
in person, when possible, critical goods, even homemade sanitary supplies 
and emergency entitlements to the most in-need households. The question 
is, can the knowledge the Covid pandemic revealed about intracommunity 
inequalities in access and the disruption it brought to traditional community 
structures be constructively harnessed? Can this experience bolster the com-
mitment to inclusive communities with accountable plans to reach the most 
vulnerable, actively solicit young female participation, establish permanent 
female-accessible platforms through which to deliver health information, 
mental health, social support, as well as vital commodities including contra-
ception, and increase food security, impart livelihood skills, extend connec-
tivity, and build a wider basis of civic engagement—before the next crisis?
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Demographic Contributions 
to Policymaking during the 
Pandemic 
sonaLde desai
as deMographers LooK BacK on 2020, it seems likely that it will be with a 
greater appreciation for the importance of demographic data in a public health 
emergency, possibly coupled with some regret at missing an opportunity for 
making meaningful contributions to public discourse as nations struggled to 
cope with the pandemic. I hope this regret will translate into energizing our 
field to reshape the way we go about our business. 
Paul Demeny (1988), in an article published in Population and Devel-
opment Review, commented that demography as a discipline has long been 
uneasy trying to balance its role as producer of knowledge with seeing this 
knowledge applied in service of public policy. As we speculate about the 
impact of Covid-19 on the future of our discipline, it is much easier to think 
about how it may change our repertoire of research topics and methodologies 
than to reflect on whether the way our field has organized itself was condu-
cive to public service during these difficult times. 
The most significant impact of Covid-19 on demography is likely to be in 
the arena of data collection. Mortality data, particularly age- and cause-specif-
ic mortality data, were invaluable in estimating the seriousness of Covid-19. 
As the pandemic’s course progressed and concerns about economic impacts 
began to dominate, most countries adopted more sophisticated approaches 
to targeting vulnerable populations. Areas in which Covid positivity rates 
exceeded a certain threshold were locked down; individuals in some areas 
and some occupations were offered social protection benefits; businesses and 
modes of travel with greater disease transmission possibilities were not al-
lowed to operate; individuals with certain health conditions were prioritized 
for testing and now vaccination. Demographic data were widely used to aid 
in this decision-making, justifying the costs and effort involved in collecting 
these data and setting the stage for future investments in data collection.
Sonalde Desai, Department of Sociology, University of Maryland and National Council of Applied 
Economic Research, New Delhi.
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The Indian government was surprised when, immediately following 
the lockdown, thousands of migrants from metropolitan cities began walking 
back to their hometowns, carrying the disease with them. As the government 
started looking for data on the number of rural migrants living in urban areas 
and their communities of origin and destination, it was discovered that migra-
tion data in India are minimal. It would be surprising if, in a post-pandemic 
world, data collection in India does not emphasize collecting more informa-
tion about migrants and their living conditions. Similarly, given the greater 
vulnerability of individuals with preexisting health conditions to SAR-CoV-2, 
most countries have recognized the need for collecting information about 
disease prevalence. This interest in disease prevalence may well translate 
into a greater emphasis on collecting biomarkers, increasingly a staple of 
demographic surveys. 
While the need for data has been high during the pandemic, collecting 
new data has been very difficult. As a result, investments in diverse research 
methodologies, particularly those that do not require face-to-face contact, 
have grown. While telephone surveys have emerged as a method of choice, 
web-based surveys and other modes of data collection such as GPS location-
based surveys of social interaction are beginning to play an important role 
in providing data. The multinational Facebook Covid Symptom Study, with 
millions of participants, provides an exciting example. Over the coming de-
cade, data collected through these nontraditional sources will be subjected 
to greater scrutiny for reliability and representativeness, setting off a minor 
industry. 
If the pandemic is likely to offer an increased emphasis on what Krea-
ger (2015,  p. S34) terms “Demography in Service of the State” through its 
data-collection arm, self-reflexive demographers might wonder whether 
demographic contributions to the public discourse, beyond the data we col-
lect, lived up to its mark. 
The pandemic highlighted topics that fall squarely within our do-
main—population mobility and social interaction; age, gender, and social 
class-specific prevalence of health risks such as cardiovascular conditions and 
diabetes; labor-force participation and nature of work; poverty and economic 
vulnerability. While many disciplines address one of these topics, the multi-
disciplinary nature of demography created a potential for us to integrate all 
of these considerations, thereby offering powerful tools for policy analysis 
that can be made locally specific. Sadly, this integration did not take place 
because it required different disciplines to work together. Although demog-
raphy is multidisciplinary in its organization, true interdisciplinarity is harder 
to achieve, which may have limited demography’s contributions to public 
policy at this critical time. 
Demographic research through decades, most recently reflected in work 
by Case and Deaton (2020), shows that poverty is a leading cause of disease 
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and death. If lockdowns minimize the spread of the pandemic and reduce 
income, should we not have tried to integrate considerations of health and 
mortality impacts of poverty and unemployment in our decision matrix 
through a feedback loop? Epidemiological models were remarkably silent 
about this feedback. 
Social assistance benefits offered during the pandemic have been mostly 
agnostic regarding what demographers know about life-cycle forces that push 
people in and out of poverty and how they vary across countries. For ex-
ample, demographic studies have consistently highlighted the vulnerability of 
single-parent families to external shocks. Single parents deprived of childcare 
may be more likely to fall into poverty. Occupational sex segregation often 
results in a disproportionate concentration of women in hospitality and retail 
sales. Thus, demographic insights would suggest that mother-headed families 
are more likely to be vulnerable to the pandemic’s economic shocks. How-
ever, these insights have not been incorporated into the design and delivery 
of safety nets in the context of the pandemic. 
How do we explain this exclusion of demographic insights from the 
policy discourse? Paul Demeny argued, “social science research directed to 
the developing countries in the field of population has now become almost 
exclusively harnessed to serve the narrowly conceived short-term interests of 
programs that embody existing orthodoxy in international population policy. 
In such a role, the contributions of research to social betterment are at best 
marginal” (Demeny 1988, p. 472). 
Demeny’s words, written over three decades ago, were surprisingly pre-
scient. As of December 2020, the webpage on Covid-19 at the website of the 
International Union for the Scientific Study of the Population (IUSSP 2021) 
shows a substantial number of articles on the use of demographic data in es-
timating Covid-related mortality and a few items on the potentially negative 
impact of the pandemic on women. Yet, issues that have preoccupied gov-
ernments worldwide as they seek to regulate movement across national and 
subnational boundaries, grapple with appropriate timing for imposing and 
reducing restrictions on economic activities, and provide subsidies, income 
transfers, and food aid to their populations are remarkable in their absence 
from this page. 
I fully anticipate that this omission will be redressed in decades to come. 
Demographers will focus on the natural experiment that the pandemic of-
fers to look at the impact of this year out of time on different cohorts and 
different life-cycle events. Researchers will focus on a range of topics such 
as comparison of learning outcomes between children experiencing distance 
education in primary school compared to that in secondary school, the impact 
of entering the labor market in 2020 vis-à-vis in earlier years, differential 
gendered impact of school closure on men and women, and, long-term health 
implications of being infected by SARS-CoV-2. Nonetheless, our inability to 
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integrate what we already know into evidence-based policy design has been 
limited, possibly because of the way our discipline is organized. 
I hope that the field will reflect on these missed opportunities for con-
tributing to the public good when our inputs were most needed. Demogra-
phers have great potential for engaging the world of policymaking, and not 
all of it is limited to family planning programs or maternal and child health. 
However, to contribute to diverse discourses, we need to see ourselves as full 
partners and contributors to public policy and not merely as producers of data 
consumed by others. 
It would be a mistake to attribute the absence of demographers from 
policy responses surrounding the pandemic only to the disjunction between 
academic researchers and policy mavericks. Academic economists were 
actively engaged in grappling with the policy challenges presented by the 
pandemic, as a thoughtful statement by academic economists at the Interna-
tional Growth Centre (IGC) demonstrates (IGC 2020), making the omission 
of demographic insights from these responses even more puzzling. 
How do we explain the muted nature of demography’s response to 
the crisis? Perhaps answers to this puzzle lie in an article by Alberto Palloni 
articulating the DNA of the discipline. Palloni (2002, p. 36) termed demog-
raphy a dependent discipline, noting “Research practice of demography is 
characterized by heavy incursions from outside…demographers are sophis-
ticated consumers of theoretical products elaborated elsewhere.…This is not 
an ideal set of conditions to generate accepted claims of scientific territory, 
academic assertiveness, or self-assurance even within nonacademic profes-
sional environments.”
The multidisciplinary nature of demography masks our lack of assertive-
ness. Economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists attend 
the annual meeting of Population Association of America (PAA). Many schol-
ars from these disciplines publish in demographic journals and demographers 
build on insights from these fields in their own work. Nonetheless, the core 
enterprise of demography remains isolated from these adjacent disciplines 
and demographers rarely make assertive statements about policy formula-
tion outside of what we consider our traditional areas of expertise such as 
family planning and health policy. Lack of demographic inputs in the design 
of social policies in the wake of the pandemic was particularly jarring and 
became obvious only when policies failed or problems emerged, such as the 
plight of stranded migrants.  
I hope that in years to come, demographers will adopt a more assertive 
stance when it comes to public policies and engage in genuinely interdisci-
plinary research and dialogue. Disciplinary training in neighboring disciplines 
like economics, political science, and sociology will be the norm and politics 
of policymaking. The role of evidence and data in this enterprise will become 
a required course in demographic training. This will allow demographic 
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knowledge to be integrated in public policy domains hitherto reserved for 
other disciplines such as economic development or social protection policies. 
Most importantly, we will begin to enlarge areas we see as squarely within 
the domain of demography in our research and data collection, returning us 
to our roots in political arithmetic. 
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What Demographers Need—
and What the World Needs from 
Demographers—in Response to 
Covid-19
jessica y. ho
charged With the tasK of providing an assessment of how Covid-19 will 
shape global demographic research needs over the next five to ten years, my 
mind immediately turned to the question of what demographers will need to 
carry out their research: data. We demographers are a data-hungry group—
we would like more data, of the highest-quality possible, as soon as possible, 
and as widely available and accessible as possible.
The pandemic has underscored the pressing need to invest in and main-
tain the quality and integrity of our essential sources of demographic data 
around the world.  In far too much of the world, and especially in low- and 
middle-income countries, we still lack high-quality vital registration systems. 
For example, Indonesia—currently the fourth most populous nation in the 
world—does not have a vital registration system with complete coverage of 
the population. Covid-19 has focused the public’s attention on the importance 
of these systems, and it has exerted demands on these systems that they have 
often been unable to meet, to the great detriment of our understanding of 
and ability to develop informed responses to the pandemic. It is critical that 
this acute recognition of how important these vital registration systems are 
to our understanding of population health, processes, and dynamics is not 
short-lived.
Of course, data issues are not restricted to developing countries. High-
income countries with longstanding vital registration systems have also 
struggled to provide adequate information to assess the dimensions and 
impacts of the pandemic. In the United States, there has been a lamentable 
paucity of data by race/ethnicity and at finer geographic levels available to 
researchers and to the public. These limitations, along with the slow release 
of these data, have greatly hampered our ability to derive precise estimates of 
the pandemic’s outsized impact on disadvantaged populations and to compare 
Jessica Y. Ho, Leonard Davis School of Gerontology and Department of Sociology, University of 
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how we are faring relative to other countries. The lack of subgroup- and area-
level data and the lags in reporting have contributed to mistaken assumptions 
about the pandemic, including the belief that children, suburbs, and rural 
areas would be unaffected. 
It is also important to recognize that, even before Covid-19, we lacked 
timely mortality data in many high-income countries. On average, the lag 
between the current year and the most recent year for which data are avail-
able is roughly one to three years for all-cause mortality and two to five years 
for data by cause of death. This substantial lag hampers our ability to identify 
and study contemporary demographic trends. Covid-19 has revealed how 
dangerous this lack of timely information can be when facing a new and 
fast-developing threat. It also means that we are years behind in discover-
ing other important phenomena including life expectancy declines, stalled 
progress in reducing cardiovascular disease mortality, and the direction of the 
contemporary American drug overdose epidemic.
Around the world, data are being delayed, distorted, and marshaled in 
support of political agenda precisely because they are so valuable. We have 
witnessed a tug of war around hospital data once routinely reported to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and unprecedented challenges 
in fielding the 2020 Census in the United States.  Our data collection systems 
for births, deaths, and migration  are too important—too vital, as their name 
suggests—to be subverted by political interference and underinvestment. We 
must also strike the right balance between providing sufficient information 
to assess the health of populations and the privacy of deceased individuals.
While this may seem like a difficult charge, it is not an impossible one. 
Central banks provide one potential model of both independent and timely 
data releases. There is a longstanding tradition in Western democracies of 
central banks maintaining independence in setting monetary policy and in 
the collection and dissemination of data. Economic data are prioritized to 
the point where they regularly have monthly, if not weekly, releases. Surely 
our demographic data are equally as important. Given the extent of recent 
political interference in the collection and dissemination of demographic data, 
demographers should advocate for a similar degree of independence for our 
statistical agencies to safeguard demographic data. In short, we must find a 
way to establish and sustain robust vital registration systems and censuses 
around the world that provide timely data and that are resilient to a wide 
array of crises and challenges. Ensuring the independence of data collection 
systems and protecting them from partisan manipulation are integral parts 
of this task. 
As a scholar of health and mortality who is based in the United States 
but often conducts comparative research, my wish list for data is extensive. 
Thinking about studying the diverse impacts of Covid-19, my thoughts 
quickly jump to, “Wouldn’t it be wonderful if every country in the world had 
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a large longitudinal survey that was nationally representative, covered the 
entire age range, fielded an extensive battery of questions about demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics, and also collected a comprehensive panel 
of biomarkers? Oh, if the response rates were well above 90 percent and the 
data were publicly accessible, that would be the cherry on top.” Sadly, we are 
far from this ideal scenario. 
It is worthwhile to ask, “What would the perfect data be?” However, de-
mographers have always been acutely aware of data needs and the shortfalls 
of reality. In response, they have developed a flexible methodological toolkit, 
a strong comparative advantage in working with scarce data, and a keen un-
derstanding of the minimum requirements needed to arrive at meaningful 
conclusions about population processes. I am confident that at this moment, 
demographers are working on developing or adapting indirect estimation 
methods for measuring Covid-19’s impact in countries without robust vital 
registration systems. 
What else will demographers be studying in the coming years, and 
what does the world need from demographers? Demographers are uniquely 
well-positioned to make the case for the population perspective. It is increas-
ingly common to focus on the individual determinants of health and other 
outcomes. Many of the open questions that have been posed about Covid-19 
and its impacts operate at the individual level. For example, what will the 
long-run health consequences be for young adults who contract Covid-19 
today? Individual determinants certainly matter, but we should not lose sight 
of key factors operating at other levels. It is clear that individuals are situated 
within families, neighborhoods, communities, localities, and countries. The 
pandemic has underscored the fact that where people live and how those in 
power have handled the pandemic affect how much exposure individuals will 
have to the pandemic and its social and economic impacts. 
At the time of this writing, the United States has had roughly 20.7 
million Covid-19 cases and about 352,000 deaths. Taiwan, whose popula-
tion is roughly the size of Australia’s, has had about 815 cases and 7 deaths. 
Glimpses of life in countries like South Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore 
have seemed unimaginably different from life in the United States during the 
pandemic. All around the world, countries have their share of racial/ethnic 
and religious minorities and people who have indigenous ancestry, are obese, 
are of low socioeconomic status, or are immunocompromised. All else being 
equal, more advantaged groups tend to have better health. But all else is not 
equal. The likelihood that a given individual in the global population contracts 
and/or dies from Covid-19 has much to do with their country’s national-level 
response to the pandemic. A poor person in a high-income country with poor 
handling of the pandemic may have an astronomically higher risk of exposure 
to Covid-19 than a poor person in a lower-income country that has imple-
mented an effective response. It is important to understand the individual 
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characteristics that put people at risk of dying from Covid-19. It is equally 
important to understand the factors that have safeguarded the health and 
well-being of entire national populations. Even if some of these conditions 
cannot be replicated in other contexts, if we don’t ask the right questions, we 
won’t get complete answers. 
I believe the field of demography has many important contributions to 
make, and I hope it will play to its strengths in the coming years. We need 
to have confidence that we are working with the right figures and the right 
measures. Demographers have an essential role in helping the public better 
understand and interpret the statistics being thrown at us in our data-driven 
world.
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Assessing the Demographic 
Consequences of the Covid-19 
Pandemic
eMiLy KLancher Merchant
deMographers and other sociaL scientists have long recognized that so-
called natural disasters are always also social and political. While extreme 
weather events, earthquakes, famines, and pandemics may originate in na-
ture, their effects are always structured by existing social inequities and by 
political responses. In the Anthropocene—our current geological epoch, in 
which biogeochemical change is primarily driven by human activities—it has 
become clear that even the origins of such disasters are not entirely natural. 
Natural disasters are typically localized in space, usually within countries, 
foreclosing the possibility of comparative analysis. As a global pandemic, 
however, the Covid-19 event affords demographers an unusual research op-
portunity. As demographers investigate the demographic consequences of the 
pandemic in the regions with which they are most familiar, they should also 
collaborate on comparative analysis to determine how social inequities and 
political responses in various parts of the world mediated between a global 
disease and its local demographic effects. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has by now had an unmistakable impact on 
each of the core demographic processes—mortality, fertility, and migration—
in all parts of the world. It has also affected the collection of demographic data. 
This essay describes some of the demographic consequences in the United 
States in order to point to opportunities for comparison with other parts of 
the world. To investigate these consequences, demographers will need data 
and methods with which to measure the short- and long-term effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic on fertility, mortality, and migration, taking into account 
global disease processes, local social structures, and political responses at the 
level of public health institutions. (In many countries, this is the national 
level, but, in the United States, it has typically been the state or county level.) 
Such comparative research will not only help us better understand why Co-
vid-19 had the demographic consequences it had (and will continue to have) 
in each part of the world, but may also point to ways we can make societies 
Emily Klancher Merchant, Science and Technology Studies, University of California Davis.
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around the world more resilient in the face of future disasters that may not 
be individually predictable, but are sure to come in one form or another, 
particularly as the pace of climate change increases. 
Mortality 
Perhaps the most obvious demographic consequence of the Covid-19 pan-
demic has been an increase in mortality, both from the disease caused by 
the SARS-COV2 virus and from the secondary effects of the virus on health 
systems and economies. According to the Johns Hopkins University Corona-
virus Resource Center, more than 1.8 million people worldwide have died 
from Covid-19 at the time of this writing, with over 350,000 deaths—ap-
proximately 19 percent of the total—occurring in the United States. While 
the early rhetoric surrounding Covid-19 maintained that the disease does not 
discriminate, it quickly became clear that not everyone is equally susceptible. 
People who are unable to isolate are at greater risk of contracting the disease, 
while those who are older or carry a heavier burden of preexisting condi-
tions and comorbidities are less likely to survive it. In the United States, these 
categories intersect with one another and with the categories that structure 
social inequality, in this case race and socioeconomic status. Poor and non-
white Americans are less likely to be able to isolate—due to service-sector 
and factory jobs, jobs that do not offer paid (or sometimes even unpaid) sick 
time, and household crowding—and are more likely to carry comorbidities 
as a result of living in food deserts, the inequitable siting of environmental 
hazards, and stark inequalities in access to health care. In other countries, 
different histories of social inequality will likely structure mortality in differ-
ent ways. Also critical is the public health response to the pandemic, which 
was abrupt and highly effective in many parts of Asia (including Australia 
and New Zealand), somewhat less so in Europe, and truly deplorable in the 
United States and some parts of Latin America. Comparative research on the 
short- and long-term mortality consequences of Covid-19 will need to tease 
the effects of the disease itself apart from the underlying social conditions that 
made some people more susceptible to it and from the political and public 
health response.
Fertility
In contrast to the mortality consequences of Covid-19, which became appar-
ent very early on and have been diligently tracked by a number of agencies, 
it may take several years to fully understand and account for the fertility 
consequences. These studies, too, will need to examine the results of the 
disease itself, such as the potential effects of Covid-19 on sperm production; 
underlying social inequities, such as existing risks of maternal and perinatal 
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mortality, which may have been exacerbated by the pandemic; and policy 
responses that may shape future childbearing decisions through the distribu-
tion of the burden of childcare. In the United States, the immediate effects 
of Covid-19 on fertility operated through those who were pregnant when 
the pandemic began and those who were in the process of trying to conceive 
with the help of various assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Among 
those who were pregnant when the pandemic began, the same women who 
already face higher risks of maternal and perinatal mortality—poor women 
and especially black women and Latinas—also faced a higher risk of contract-
ing Covid-19. Those who were trying to conceive using ART had to pause 
this process while health systems retooled to focus on treating Covid-19. As 
the pandemic wore on, however, fertility clinics reopened, and many people 
renewed their efforts to conceive. 
In the long run, policy responses to the pandemic will also affect fertil-
ity through the future childbearing decisions of individuals and couples. In 
the United States, the pandemic demonstrated that, even at the best of times, 
most families get by only through a delicate balancing act, piecing together 
the inadequate and largely unregulated childcare resources that are available 
to those who can afford them. When the pandemic shut down schools and 
day care centers in March, it was largely mothers who put their careers on 
hold to take care of young children and to help older children navigate their 
classes on Zoom. This is not a natural response to the pandemic, but rather 
one overdetermined by a long history of gender discrimination in the labor 
force and an absence of policies to support working mothers and dual-career 
families. Indeed, the same factors that have kept fertility lower in countries 
like Italy and Japan, where mothers are primarily responsible for childcare, 
than in countries like Sweden, where there is more public support for dual-
career families, will also determine the long-term fertility consequences of 
Covid-19.
Migration 
The migration consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic will also need to be 
evaluated in both the short- and long-term. When it became clear that the 
SARS-COV2 virus was going to cause a pandemic, countries around the world 
began to limit travel and close borders. As a result, many international so-
journers returned to their countries of origin, while others decided to remain 
abroad for the duration. An unexpected consequence was that, as workers 
abroad were prevented from returning home due to travel restrictions, the 
migrant smuggling business developed a sideline of smuggling people back 
home. As universities scrambled to shift classes online, many also closed their 
dormitories, sending students home to various parts of the world. These re-
locations are likely to be relatively short-lived. Most universities and college 
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students are anxiously awaiting a return to campus life, and restrictions on 
travel will undoubtedly ease when a vaccine or effective treatments become 
available. The increase in remote work, however, may have a longer-term 
impact on migration. Now that it has become apparent that many jobs can be 
done remotely, some large employers have begun to reevaluate their work-
from-home or telecommuting policies, and smaller employers are likely to 
follow suit. An increase in opportunities to work remotely will also afford 
some people—those with jobs that can be done remotely—a broader set of 
choices over where to live that could dramatically reshape social geographies. 
An impressive number of countries, ranging from Antigua to Georgia, are 
offering one-year renewable remote work visas to “digital nomads” who can 
demonstrate income and health insurance and afford to pay a fairly modest 
fee. Demographers will need to investigate the determinants of migration 
when some people are no longer geographically bound by their jobs, and 
should examine how the extreme mobility of some workers—typically those 
with jobs that pay more and offer better benefits—affects the fortunes of im-
mobile workers, such as those in service industries that rely on proximity to 
their clientele. As with mortality and fertility, the migration consequences of 
the Covid-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work will be shaped primarily 
by underlying social structures and public policies.
Demographic Data 
In addition to its effects on mortality, fertility, and migration rates and pat-
terns, the Covid-19 pandemic has also had consequences for the collection of 
demographic data. This has been most apparent in the United States, where 
the in-person enumeration of households that did not return their 2020 
Census form by mail or respond online was first delayed by the pandemic 
and then curtailed prematurely by the Trump administration, likely leading 
to an unnecessarily high rate of undercounting. Under ordinary circum-
stances, it is relatively straightforward for demographers to determine who 
was missed by a census. However, the enormous demographic upheavals 
generated by the Covid-19 pandemic will likely make this task more dif-
ficult. One particular challenge stems from the fact that many of the people 
who are most vulnerable to undercounting—the poor and non-White, as 
well as non-English-speakers—are also particularly vulnerable to Covid-19 
mortality. Another stems from the fact that most U.S. universities closed in 
March, scattering students across the country and the world right before the 
Census. The American media has paid particular attention to the 2020 U.S. 
Census because of the controversies that had already surrounded it—most 
notably the citizenship question—and because of the political consequences 
of undercounting. However, the United States is not alone in the impact the 
Covid-19 pandemic has had on its census. Since 1950, the United Nations has 
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encouraged all countries of the world to take censuses in or near years ending 
in zero, so many countries have had to manage enumeration in the midst 
of the pandemic. While a few countries—such as Mexico and Mongolia—
completed their data collection early in the year, most have had to suspend 
or delay enumeration, or substitute data from population registers or other 
administrative records. The pandemic will, therefore, have a larger effect on 
demographic data collection in countries that lack adequate administrative 
records and communication infrastructures that would facilitate enumeration 
by mail, telephone, or Internet rather than in person.
As a global pandemic unfolding simultaneously across the world, the 
Covid-19 episode affords unique opportunities for comparative research on all 
of the basic demographic processes. Such research may be able to determine 
the specific contributions of the disease itself, underlying social inequities, 
and policy responses to changes in mortality, fertility, migration, and census-
taking. Understanding these natural, social, and political factors will be critical 
to evaluating vulnerability to future natural (and not-so-natural) disasters, 
and to promoting resilience. 
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Rethinking the Role of 
Demographers in Times of Crisis
thoai d. ngo 
stephanie r. psaKi
crises have a Way of casting light on systemic failures in our society that, al-
though not new, were previously overlooked by those who were not directly 
affected. The speed with which SARS-CoV-2 has spread across the globe, 
leading to nearly 90 million confirmed cases of Covid-19 and 2.0 million 
deaths to date (Dong et al. 2020), along with devastating economic effects 
for millions, was largely unfathomable a year ago, even within the global 
health community. 
Many had warned of the threat that zoonoses pose to human popula-
tions (Lederberg 1988), and recent outbreaks, including from the Zika and 
Ebola viruses as well as previous coronaviruses, should have served as glar-
ing warnings. The scale of damage from Covid-19 in many countries is also 
perhaps not surprising, given the lack of sufficient social safety nets to protect 
marginalized groups. In the United States, entrenched systems of oppression 
and racism reinforce social and economic disparities. These include the lack 
of health insurance, paid leave, affordable childcare, unemployment insur-
ance for many, and quality housing and education, which, in turn, exacerbate 
health outcomes among poor communities and people of color (Ngo 2020).
That is to say, in many ways this pandemic should not be a surprise, 
and as demographers—many with expertise in health—we should have been 
more prepared to respond. Some scientific disciplines have initiated swift and 
effective responses. Most impressively, multiple SARS-CoV-2 vaccines with 
high levels of efficacy have been developed in less than a year and rollout has 
begun. This represents a dramatic—and previously unthinkable—advance 
in the field of vaccine development, due in part to unprecedented collabora-
tion. But the response from many demographers—trained in the distribution 
and movement of populations, a perspective that is critical to understand-
ing disease spread—has been slow. While the Covid-19 crisis is particularly 
acute, it is not the only area where our discipline has been slow to respond. 
Thoai D. Ngo, Stephanie R. Psaki, Population Council.
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The world has changed rapidly in recent decades, and this moment calls on 
demographers to ask how we can evolve with it.    
While there will undoubtedly be discussions in the coming years about 
new topics of focus for demographers, we propose several opportunities to 
change how we do our work to improve our ability to shape social and health 
policies while being prepared to respond to the repercussions of the Covid-19 
pandemic and future crises.
1. Promote research transparency and improve efficiency. During the Covid-19 
pandemic, we have witnessed widespread disinformation and grow-
ing distrust for science, especially in the United States, stemming from 
the growing politicization of science and medical guidance. Moving 
forward, scientists across diverse disciplines must come together to 
counter this growing distrust through greater transparency. Scientists 
engaged in Covid-19 research have begun this process by sharing 
protocols for vaccine trials publicly (Doshi 2020), as well preprints of 
new research (Dan et al. 2020) and datasets providing information 
on SARS-CoV-2 and Covid-19 (Abuya et al. 2020), cultivating trust 
and supporting more rapid innovation in the field. Sharing our work 
more transparently (including data, code, and protocols) and making 
better use of existing data will also allow scientists to conduct critical 
research through a multisectoral lens and will support better collabo-
ration across disciplines. For example, researchers who study health 
and poverty in urban slums can collaborate with infectious disease 
modelers to study contact patterns and SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks 
by demographic factors, including socioeconomic status (Quaife et al. 
2020). Since in-person research activities have been halted or mini-
mized in many settings due to physical distancing policies, and remote 
data collection comes with many methodological challenges, sharing 
datasets will also allow early career researchers to continue building 
their skills and contributions to the field.  
2. Collaborate across disciplines. There are many perspectives that demo-
graphic research can offer to better understand the effects of the 
pandemic, anticipate risks to certain groups, and forecast needs and 
challenges as we rebuild. For example, social demography can be used 
to examine the broader social effects of Covid-19, such as on time use 
within households, and decisions about child marriage. Demographic 
modeling can predict the indirect impacts of Covid-19, including physi-
cal distancing and school closures, on the future, on issues such as mi-
gration, fertility, education, marriage, family composition, and income. 
These questions will be answered most effectively if demographers 
proactively foster collaborations within our field and form strategic on-
going partnerships between public health researchers, epidemiologists, 
economists, and others. As part of these collaborations, demographers 
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can link different types of data to traditional population-based surveys, 
such as social media, spatial, and administrative data. 
3. Invest in global collaborating research centers anchored by cohort studies. On-
going community-based cohort studies offer enormous value to the 
demographic research field but are expensive to build and maintain. 
In addition to supporting collaboration across disciplines, these sites 
should be locally led while harnessing expertise from across the globe. 
Such cohorts can be used as disease surveillance systems, allowing 
researchers to study population movements and dynamics, examine 
rising social movements, and anticipate growing risks. When an out-
break occurs, scientists can easily pivot to study disease transmission, 
assess the health, social, and economic effects, and model the potential 
consequences in the larger population. These ongoing collaborative 
cohorts can serve as “labs” for the development of innovative solutions, 
including pharmaceutical as well as economic and behavioral interven-
tions. The Rakai Community Cohort Study in Uganda (Rakai Health 
Sciences Program 2020), established in 1988 in response to the HIV 
pandemic, has been a research “lab” that produces important social and 
clinical innovations. If done properly, this model would save time and 
resources needed to establish study populations when a crisis occurs.  
4. Collect data that accurately represent the challenges facing overlooked popula-
tions. Large-scale surveys, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS 2020), are nationally representative and play an invaluable role 
for demographers and public health researchers alike. But national 
surveys are rarely able to capture the conditions and characteristics of 
important subgroups such as indigenous populations, migrants, racial/
ethnic minorities, or gender minority groups in a specific geographic 
area. SARS-CoV-2 infects and kills these groups at higher rates (CDC 
2020) and they often bear the biggest social and economic burden due 
to systematic marginalization. If surveys fail to include them, we will 
be perpetually ill-equipped to respond to these challenges. Similarly, 
urban centers are growing and becoming more complex. We will need 
to change the way we collect and analyze data to adequately capture 
the experiences of populations living in different neighborhoods within 
urban areas in order to advocate for more inclusive policies and inter-
ventions. 
5. Find ways to quickly and effectively communicate findings with decision-
makers. A crisis like the Covid-19 pandemic underscores how essential 
it is to synthesize and share evidence with decision-makers swiftly and 
rigorously—this entire pandemic has played out more quickly than it 
takes to publish most peer-reviewed papers. The peer-review process 
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plays an essential—although not foolproof—role in ensuring that evi-
dence is vetted, and research methods are shared transparently. And, 
importantly in the midst of a crisis, the detailed methodologies shared 
through scientific publications allow researchers to build off one an-
other’s work. Researchers have shared preprints of papers, and many 
academic journals have committed to fast-tracking the publication of 
Covid-19-related findings, but we also need to push ourselves to find 
new and innovative ways of sharing findings in real time. Populations 
around the world are facing numerous other challenges, including 
climate change, urbanization, and social unrest. There is no perfect re-
search study, even with ample time, and taking a Bayesian approach to 
“updating our priors” with rapidly evolving data may be more relevant 
and useful in times of crisis. There is often a trade-off between speed 
and accuracy, and research transparency should help. 
This crisis presents demographers with an opportunity to ask important 
questions about the future of this field. What is the role of demographers in 
this moment? And how can that role evolve to provide relevant real-time 
guidance to decision-makers? The Covid-19 pandemic has both exacerbated 
and shed light on deep inequalities and failures in our system. As we look to 
the future, many have expressed the hope that we can rethink our systems 
to “build back better.” In the same way, this global crisis has tested the ability 
of demographers to use their skills in support of better population health. We 
now have the opportunity to reflect on how we might strengthen our field 
to better respond to future crises.
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Covid-19 Aftermath and 
Population Science’s Research 
Agenda
aLBerto paLLoni
there are Many doMains where the Covid-19 pandemic will leave deep 
footprints on the world’s populations. Albeit with unequal degree of detail, 
I consider three of these domains: infancy and early childhood, the elderly, 
and the “sandwich generation” of young adults. I assess the possible demo-
graphic impacts of the pandemic, identify key problems, and propose research 
questions and materials that may improve understanding of those impacts 
and contribute to designing interventions to attenuate the damage on future 
generations.
Mothers, Children, Covid-19, and the Health 
and Well-being of Adults for the Rest of the 
Twenty-First Century 
Assessments of the potential long-term impact of Covid-19 on individuals 
who will become older adults 50 to 60 years from now should consider several 
types of exposures: parents about to conceive, embryos soon after zygote for-
mation and implantation, fetuses during uterine life, infants breastfed during 
the pandemic, and young children whose physical and cognitive development 
is entirely dependent on parental resources, preferences, and behaviors. The 
delayed manifestation of exposure to Covid-19 will be a function of when 
during these windows of time the exposure took place, its intensity, and its 
duration. 
We know that, as a consequence of multiple interventions designed to 
arrest transmission of the virus, virtually all affected populations experienced 
at some point irregularities in food supply, sharp rises in unemployment, de-
creases in household income, increased isolation and multiplication of stress-
ful conditions, and weakened access to health care. We also know that these 
conditions were not shared equally, either within borders or internationally: 
Alberto Palloni, Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, IGED, Con-
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poor, marginalized, vulnerable populations are everywhere disproportion-
ately affected, and these account for a higher share of population in low- and 
middle-income countries than in high-income countries. 
There are three main pathways from exposures to Covid-19 pandemic 
conditions and delayed effects on offspring. The first is via nutritional con-
straints, the second is a function of parental stress, and the third depends on 
the direct impact of the virus on pregnant mothers or mothers who deliver 
during the pandemic. As to the first, despite short-term policy interventions, 
the decline in household income induced by prolonged unemployment and 
disruption of livelihoods will become a lingering feature of the pandemic, 
particularly among poor and marginalized populations in all countries. De-
ficiencies in paternal and maternal nutritional status (poor caloric intake 
and a nutrient-deficient diet) right before and during pregnancy impair fetal 
growth and derail early development via a combination of responses, some 
with immediate and some with delayed effects. Poor maternal health status 
can perturb the normal course of a pregnancy and complicate delivery, and 
maternal viral infections during pregnancy may compromise fetal develop-
ment. Quality and length of breastfeeding depend on maternal nutrition and 
maternal stress. Also, unlike in-utero growth, mother-infant feeding is not 
mediated by barriers, so poor maternal diet directly exposes the child to risks 
that may have immediate and long-term effects. Empirical evidence from ani-
mal studies suggests that maternal depression and stress during some stages of 
pregnancy promote changes similar to those associated with deficient mater-
nal diets. Further, it is known that postnatal parental stress leads to offspring 
depression and a heightened stress response, which has been associated with 
hypertension, cardiovascular disease, obesity, and metabolic disorders.
These considerations suggest that, all else constant, the long-term ef-
fect of the pandemic may be an increase in cohort-specific cognitive and 
chronic conditions due to exposure in utero and during infancy. Because 
the impacts of Covid-19 are unequally distributed within a population, these 
delayed effects will reproduce or augment current adult health and mortal-
ity inequalities. Individuals with limited resources who are less able to cope 
under normal conditions are far more likely to contract Covid-19 and less 
likely to experience a smooth recovery. Since early-infant and childhood 
health also influences educational attainment and adult labor-market suc-
cess, the health-related effects of the pandemic can also eventually exacerbate 
socioeconomic inequality. To this we must add other inequality-enhancing 
mechanisms triggered by responses to the pandemic, such as those associated 
with the quality of learning—schooling disparities that result from adoption 
of online instruction, disruption and discontinuation of school attendance, 
or family displacement.
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The Contribution of Population Research  
Population researchers could contribute to tackling these problems in two 
ways. First, based on an existing rich knowledge base, they could formulate 
new studies to shed light on long-term consequences, using as a foundation 
the investigation of problems that have been identified by studies of the 
1918 pandemic. Fifty or 100 years from now, population sciences will want 
answers to questions such as the following. To what extent did children who 
were in utero or infants during the Covid-19 pandemic experience limita-
tions in physical growth, excess illnesses, metabolic dysregulation, obesity, 
allergies, cognitive deficiencies? How do these children compare to those who 
were directly exposed to maternal infection in utero or contracted the virus 
in infancy and during early childhood? What are the social and economic 
gradients in these outcomes? Did these children experience different health 
conditions when they became adolescents and adults? Did they follow dif-
ferent educational and occupational trajectories and have differential labor 
market success? To what extent did their experience contribute to health and 
socioeconomic inequalities over their life course that will be manifested 50 
or 100 years from now?
There are a number of ways to position population sciences to inves-
tigate such questions. A first option is to initiate new mother-child cohort 
studies that combine data collection on experiences with Covid-19, family 
exposures, and coping strategies with retrieval of biomarkers at regular inter-
vals of time.  Draw a national sample of females who are pregnant during the 
pandemic, those who give birth and their children aged 0–4. Gather hospital 
records with information about pre-pregnancy, pregnancy, and delivery; 
retrieve biomarkers from mothers and children; and establish a protocol to 
follow them for a period of time until, say, physical growth comes to a halt. 
This will result in a body of data ranging from conventional demographic and 
socioeconomic information to markers of physical growth, cognitive scores, 
school performance, and exposure to risk behaviors (poor diet, lack of ex-
ercise, smoking). With suitable identifiers and consent, the data-collection 
effort will make possible the formulation of additional studies to investigate 
outcomes at different stages of the life cycle of the same population. Some 
countries (Spain) are already planning data collection of this sort.
A second possibility is to piggyback on existing studies such as, in 
the United States, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
(NHANES), the Adolescent Health Study (AddHealth), the Fragile Families 
Study, or even the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS) survey series. 
While not all include mothers and their children as targets, it is possible to 
either add new subsamples of mother-children pairs or, alternatively, recruit 
children of current participants. While most of the data needed are retrievable 
via traditional interviews and biomarker collection, an important enhance-
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ment would be to link mother-children pairs to health and hospital records 
in order to add clinical diagnosis and evidence of treatment. As these studies 
are likely to remain in place and already include representation of minorities 
and disadvantaged groups, they could become vehicles for collecting cohort-
like information that comes close to, but is less expensive than, new cohort 
studies built from scratch. 
A third possibility consists of selecting small urban and rural areas within 
larger regions, obtaining access to hospital and health care centers, and iden-
tifying and sampling mother-child pairs. This has already been done in some 
European cities to study child obesity. This sample could then be paired with 
random samples from the same area and the entire population thus recruited 
followed for a number of years. If fielded in several areas (provinces, states), 
these region-based, quasi case-control studies should support inferences about 
heterogeneity of impacts.  
Elder Health, Covid-19, and the Intergenerational Social 
Contract
Although there are still many unknowns, it is clear that the near- and 
medium-term health effects of Covid-19 on the elderly will dwarf those ex-
perienced in younger populations, for a number of reasons, including high 
prevalence of preexisting conditions. As a result, the brunt of mortality excess 
and Covid-19 sequelae will be experienced by the elderly. Two consequences 
of this pattern are relevant.   
Covid-19-related mortality will change the frailty composition of el-
derly survivors and will induce a short-term improvement of healthy life 
expectancy. As a result, the average health-care burden on family and kin 
will contract somewhat, providing temporary respite to younger cohorts and 
especially women. However, because of lingering aftereffects among elderly 
Covid-19 survivors, it is quite possible that these short-term impacts will 
reverse course when these individuals attain older ages. As a result, the brief 
increase in healthy life expectancy will be followed by a drop and the decrease 
in expected years in disability will reverse into an increase. The resulting ex-
pansion of demand for health care will compound existing pressure on the 
health-care system. To make matters worse, it will increase the burden of 
elder care in the younger generations, whose resources will be stretched as a 
consequence of Covid-19’s impact on their own lives. 
This situation has implications for the intergenerational social contract. 
Most societies have in place systems sustaining intergenerational monetary, 
in-kind, and time transfers that still closely involve family and kin. In some 
cases, the direction of transfers is from children to elderly parents, while in 
others it is the reverse. The direction, quantity, and nature of flows depends 
on traditional norms, social class, aggregate economic conditions, and the 
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state of the nonfamilial intergenerational transfer system. It is likely that the 
effects of the pandemic will add stress to these family- and kin-based intergen-
erational flows for reasons set forth above. As a result, there will be increased 
pressure to develop or expand existing nonfamily and nonkin-based forms 
of transfers, essentially public. All this will be at a time when governments 
will be under post-crisis fiscal pressure, strapped by debt they were obliged 
to take on to sustain the near-term emergency response. 
The Contribution of Population Research
Population science is exceptionally well positioned to meet the research chal-
lenge posed by these problems. There are now in place many longitudinal 
surveys of the elderly: the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) in the US, the 
collection of Surveys of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 
many European countries, the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
in the UK, and many others. To turn these into tools for collecting information 
needed to study both the swings of healthy life expectancy and the strained 
intergenerational social contract is neither difficult nor expensive. In contrast 
to the case of research on children, the key challenge will be to create a study 
design guided by the right questions, not the collection of more information. 
Piggybacking on these surveys is feasible without refreshing samples beyond 
what these studies already plan to do. It only requires the addition of new 
questions in modules of intergenerational transfers, self-reported conditions, 
activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADL), and intergenerational transfers and assistance. 
Two new protocols could be added to those already in existence. First 
is the collection of health records of survey participants who survived the 
infection and those who died as a consequence of it. These data will provide 
rich information related to diagnostic and treatment. Second, in those cases 
where DNA collection has already been done, an effort should be made to 
draw new biomarkers using saliva, full or dried blood spot samples. Among 
other problems, this will support investigations aimed at identifying genomic 
regions associated with severity of symptoms (e.g, the ACE2 gene).
Young Adults, Covid-19, Closure of Opportunities and the 
Diffusion of Hopelessness
What about the “sandwich generation”—those who when the pandemic 
struck were in high school, college, or had recently married and initiated 
careers, or are forced to drop out of the labor force to care for young chil-
dren? Due to a number of reasons, adolescents and young adults have so far 
experienced the bulk of infections. However, the short-term course of the 
disease appears to be quite mild in this population. It is possible that, even if 
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reinfection occurs, its effects will not be more serious than those experienced 
during the first episode. 
While these considerations suggest a rather benign outlook, there 
are two consequences of the pandemic that could leave deep scars in these 
cohorts. First, there is some empirical evidence that the virus causes organ 
damage in a subset of otherwise healthy individuals, even among those who 
experience only mild effects. Symptoms include loss of memory, cognitive 
impairment, sleep disruption, and a number of physiological anomalies such 
as respiratory insufficiency, kidney dysfunction, and heart irregularities. 
Although not much is known about the risk factors associated with these 
responses or about their duration, there is growing concern that they may 
compromise the affected individuals’ capacity to resume normal activities at 
work, in school, and in the household. Furthermore, we will not know for 
some time whether, in addition to these short-term responses, there will be 
others that will be felt as delayed effects in later adult life. 
Second, members of these cohorts are most likely to experience the 
brunt of all the long-term nonhealth-related impacts of the pandemic. A list 
of these is long and may include a number of economic outcomes ranging 
from failure to get a good career start, to unstable incomes due to precarious 
employment and frequent spells of unemployment, resulting in an inability 
to save. All this with a powerful gender bias and amplifying existing inequali-
ties between those who will be able to resume their planned economic life 
course after normality is reestablished and those who will find themselves 
irretrievably displaced from it. 
These economic impacts will have consequences of their own, some of 
which may be union postponement and disruption, fertility limitation, de-
layed or foregone home purchase, and lack of resources to defray children’s 
education costs. Some of these are consequential for the young adults’ off-
spring, who will grow up in deprived environments and will see their own 
future compromised, as well. Finally, in the US, at least, these potential effects 
may combine to worsen current conditions that produce young adult hope-
lessness and poor future outlooks all of which result in the promotion of un-
healthy behaviors such as smoking, alcohol and drug consumption/addiction, 
and other self-destructive habits that translate into excess adult mortality. 
The Contribution of Population Research  
The question that the grandchildren of today’s population researchers might 
want to investigate is not just how the pandemic wreaked havoc on today’s 
cohorts of young adults, but how, through the damage it inflicted on the 
parental generation, it transmitted damage to the next generation. Many 
countries have in place studies that could be modified to take on the task of 
collecting suitable information and investigating these issues. For example, in 
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the US, there are surveys such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPPS), the Panel Sur-
vey of Income Dynamics (PSID), and perhaps even the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), all data-collection enterprises well equipped for the task. There 
is probably not even a need to recruit new participants (aside from those 
already planned). Much as in the case of elderly surveys, it suffices to tinker 
with the standard questionnaires by adding items or entire modules. Further-
more, in most developed and some developing countries, governments have 
administrative data on employment, wages, income, education, household 
composition, and, sometimes, health/mortality. These data can also often be 
linked to census-type surveys to fill in gaps in the purely administrative data 
and complement the information retrieved from longitudinal studies.
Summary
Admittedly, the study of the long-term effects of exposure among infants 
and children is a tall order. We are, however, in possession of knowledge and 
techniques that did not exist in 1918 and, unlike scientists then, we under-
stand quite well the potential long reach of a shock of the magnitude and 
duration of Covid-19. The marginal costs of piggybacking on existing studies 
are in all likelihood an order of magnitude lower than those associated with a 
new cohort study. At the very least we should pursue one or a series of these 
and be always guided by what we have learned in the debate about the 1918 
pandemic. Irrespective of the type of study we put in place, an overarching 
issue should be the intergenerational transmission of damage. The assessment 
of impacts on the elderly is a less taxing enterprise but it too requires a focus 
on problems that affect both the older generations and, simultaneously, their 
children and grandchildren. Investigation of these issues will be considerably 
enhanced by the fact that the instruments of today’s population scientists are 
far superior to those available to researchers who lived through the 1918 flu. 
We have highly refined machinery to collect, link, organize, and process em-
pirical data. We are in possession of more sophisticated analytical techniques 
to find patterns in the data and test conjectures. And, not insignificantly, we 
have vastly superior knowledge of the mechanisms that can produce long-
term effects after exogenous shocks of similar scale.
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Issues of Demographic Data 
Collection during Covid-19 and  
Its Aftermath
eduardo L.g. rios-neto
BeFore the covid-19 pandeMic, a revolution in demographic data collection 
in developing countries` national statistical offices (NSOs) was dawning. This 
revolution includes topics such as data science, big data, administrative data, 
satellite images, grid statistics, the use of biomarkers in surveys, and comput-
er-assisted interviews, among others. The Covid-19 outbreak accelerated this 
revolution. Most advances in data collection achieved during the pandemic 
are likely to prevail in its aftermath. Based on my own experience, I start this 
brief statement with a review of Covid-19 in the Brazilian household survey 
(Pnad Contínua) and a new pulse survey (Pnad Covid19), both conducted 
by IBGE (the Brazilian National Statistical Office). Then, I analyze the im-
plications of postponing the Brazilian 2020 Demographic Census to 2021. 
Finally, I discuss the consequences of advances in data collection for future 
data analysis, including for assessing the impact of Covid-19.  
The Brazilian Household Surveys (Pnad 
Contínua and Pnad Covid19) 
Pnad Contínua is a rotating panel household survey. Each new household 
included in the sample is interviewed five times in months t and t+3, before 
leaving the panel. Results are published by quarters and monthly using mov-
ing quarters. The survey is the official source of the unemployment rate, 
annual per capita household income, and inputs for calculating the monthly 
inflation rate.
On the upsurge of the pandemic, IBGE adopted social distancing starting 
March 17, 2020. Pnad Contínua was at risk of discontinuation. IBGE miti-
gated this risk by moving from a computer-assisted person interview (CAPI) 
to a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) using a mobile computing 
device (MCD) or personal digital assistant (PDA). The traditional CATI surveys 
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are not compatible with social distancing because they occur in cramped call 
centers (LAB-CATI).  The natural solution was to place the interviewers work-
ing from home (WH) using an MCD or portable smartphone (WH-CATI). I 
consider this reliance on interviewers’ WH-CATI as an innovation in Brazil 
and other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. 
A significant challenge for implementing a CATI survey is how to ob-
tain telephone numbers to reach the sampled households. Less than half of 
the interviewers collected phone numbers in the first round of surveys. All 
households in the new strata did not have telephone numbers attached.  An 
alternative to obtaining these numbers was to obtain them directly from 
telephone companies, but the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled against this op-
tion. The solution was to obtain the numbers by matching the survey sample 
with administrative data using the addresses as a block variable.  However, 
not all telephone numbers worked. Some local IBGE offices tried telegrams 
or relied on motorcycle couriers to obtain the telephone numbers in person. 
An essential comparative finding contrasting with classical telephone surveys 
is that the refusal rate in the WH-CATI survey, conducted by our trained 
interviewer, was much lower, less than 5 percent, than the average refusal 
rate of around 40 percent. The sample coverage rate comprised more than 60 
percent of the households sampled before social distancing, usually leading 
to the publication of statistics at national and state levels, within a reasonable 
confidence interval.  
Due to the pandemic, IBGE designed another household survey (Pnad 
Covid19). The new survey provided information on flu symptoms, hygienic 
habits, reports of personal Covid-19 tests, seeking health care, type of facil-
ity visited, labor market experiences (people in and out of the workforce, 
employed workforce away from work due to social distancing, employed 
population working from home, number of people working in informal em-
ployment, etc.), and income (earnings, retirement income, unemployment 
insurance, conditional cash transfer receipts, emergency Covid-19 allowance). 
The option to implement this new survey was also to generate alternative 
labor statistics in the case of an eventual discontinuation of the traditional 
Pnad Contínua.  
The Pnad Covid19 is also a WH-CATI. It is a fixed panel comprised of the 
households sampled in the Pnad Contínua during the first quarter of 2019. 
The sample corresponds to 92 percent of the 211,000 households, comprised 
of those with a telephone number in the questionnaire. Not all telephone 
numbers were valid, so matching with administrative data was also neces-
sary. We divided the sample equally into four weeks, providing independent 
results. Due to its fixed panel nature, we interview the same households each 
month. IBGE publishes the results both weekly and monthly. The coverage 
rate of telephone interviews averaged around 70 percent of the sample.  The 
sampling strategy enables us to correct for possible selectivity caused by tele-
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phone interviews by comparing them with personal interviews conducted in 
the first quarter of 2019. The first month covered by Pnad Covid19 was May 
2020. It is scheduled to last until November 2020 due to the panel’s attrition. 
IBGE may conduct the panel survey interviews again in the future. In this 
case, we could perform an analysis before (2019 sample anchor and baseline), 
during (first wave of Covid-19 from May to November 2020), and after (date 
to be defined after waves of Covid-19).  This temporal analysis could inform 
an impact evaluation of the pandemic. 
In a nutshell, the Pnad Covid19 provided useful data on self-reported flu 
symptoms that could be a proxy for Covid-19, emphasizing the loss of smell 
and taste as an essential trait. It showed that most of those with symptoms 
seeking medical treatment relied on the Brazilian universal and free- of-
charge Public Health System (SUS). The number of persons in the formal 
labor force declined during the Covid-19 pandemic while a significant pro-
portion of those working moved to do so from home. Finally, the Brazilian 
Government’s emergency Covid-19 allowance raised a substantial proportion 
of low-income households out of extreme poverty during the pandemic’s 
first six months.  
Covid-19 and the Demographic Censuses 
Covid-19 hit the planned 2020 round of demographic censuses hard. In those 
countries where the pandemic census operations were already underway 
(e.g., Mexico and the United States), it was difficult to stop. But, like many 
other countries that had not initiated the census before the onset of Covid-19, 
Brazil faced the postponement of census operations to 2021. In the Brazilian 
case, coverage difficulties, length of the questionnaire, and budgetary ceil-
ing were already weakening national census operations. However, Covid-19 
raised census operation difficulties to another level.  
In the 2010 Brazilian Demographic Census, the interview mode was 
CAPI, with the use of MCDs for the first time. IBGE was planning to maintain 
the same strategy in 2020. With the outbreak of the pandemic, four factors 
reinforced IBGE’s caution regarding the CAPI mode: uncertainty regarding 
the duration of the first wave of contagion, the possible upsurge of second or 
further waves, the lack of vaccines for census collectors, and the likely absence 
of herd immunity. A risk-averse strategy is to adopt a mixed and concurrent 
data-collection strategy, CAPI, and CATI. CATI requires telephone numbers, 
which can be obtained using the match of household lists with administra-
tive data. Alternatively, telephone numbers can be collected at the beginning 
of the census operation, during the field verification of household listings 
in the census tracts, with minimum personal interaction protocols. A third 
data-collection alternative is CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing). 
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This self-enumeration strategy enumerates hard-to-reach households such 
as gated residences and wealthy families. CAWI is also the last resource for 
unsuccessful CAPI and CATI interview attempts.  
As mentioned earlier, IBGE had to deal with complex issues associated 
with census coverage, even before Covid-19. The uncertain environment due 
to Covid-19 aggravated these challenges. A risk-averse strategy is the appli-
cation of technical tools to monitor the census operation. The estimation of 
population and dwelling density at the grid- or census-tract level is a control 
strategy to the three phases of a demographic census. It helps to evaluate the 
quality of the households` listings during the pre-enumeration phase. It also 
contributes to the daily measurement of coverage in the census tracts dur-
ing the enumeration phase. Finally, it is an alternative technique to evaluate 
census coverage and enable imputation during the post-enumeration phase. 
Another technical tool is the real-time application of demographic indicators 
such as sex ratio, age reporting, etc., displayed in dashboards so that the op-
eration can correct problems during the census enumeration phase. 
It is tempting to include Covid-19 questions in the census, but we have 
to consider that the census operation is planned well in advance to the enu-
meration stage. The Brazilian census consists of two questionnaires, a basic 
(short) questionnaire applied to all households and a long one devoted to a 
household sample. If a demographic census provides precise population enu-
meration, broken down by socioeconomic attributes, it will fulfill its primary 
role. Regarding Covid-19, it is crucial to have denominators (population at 
risk) to analyze several indicators, especially the attack rate.  
Other Data Collection Innovations and Methodologies 
Contributing to the Analysis of Covid-19 
The academic community will consider the Covid-19 pandemic as a marker 
for several natural experiments with potential to analyze causality. At the 
micro-level, a longitudinal dataset would be crucial for these studies. Unfor-
tunately, longitudinal surveys are not typical in developing countries. The 
sampling strategy in the Pnad Covid19 consisted of selecting sampled house-
holds previously chosen in the first quarter of 2019 in the Pnad Contínua. It 
is possible to conduct the “before” (first quarter of 2019) and “during” (from 
May to November 2020) analysis, using the Pnad Covid19 data. If IBGE re-
covers the Pnad Covid19 panel in the future, then the “after” component will 
enable even more robust causal analyses.  
The use of biomarkers in surveys is becoming more diffused, although 
still not prevalent in developing countries. Testing for Covid-19 has become 
essential for tracking herd immunity and other aspects. This testing informa-
tion linked to a longitudinal dataset is crucial for causal analysis. The Brazilian 
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Health Ministry considers the possibility of testing the whole Pnad Covid19 
sample, which would enrich this type of research.  
IBGE conducted two national health household surveys (Pesquisa Na-
cional de Saude—PNS) with independent samples in 2013 and 2019. These 
surveys are comprehensive on lifestyle habits such as smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, physical exercise practices, etc. They also include the prevalence 
of chronic diseases among household members. Even before the pandemic, 
IBGE planned to match the individuals in these households with the vital 
registration of deaths. The datasets linkage will entail a mortality analysis. 
With the onset of Covid-19, it will be possible to perform a before-and-after 
study, including the mediating role of lifestyles and comorbidity factors.  
If the demographic census measured household deaths due to Covid-19, 
there would be relevant applications. This census question complements vital 
statistics in terms of measuring socioeconomic differentials. Another critical 
factor not available in vital registration is the role of household composition, 
especially the presence of the elderly and the measurement of household-
level transmission, which might translate into more than one death. The 
role of the high bedroom density of individuals is a micro-level factor in the 
diffusion of contagion. Deaths in the census also entail analyzing ecological 
(macro-level) differentials such as a cluster of segregated residential areas 
comprised of dwellings with low sanitation coverage, residence in slums, the 
proximity of houses, etc.  
In a nutshell, the pandemic forced national statistical offices to inno-
vate to keep producing statistics minimizing time-series break. Some of these 
innovations proved so useful that they should stay in post-pandemic times 
without social distancing. Also, statistical offices should strive to produce data 
that could support the new research agenda derived from Covid-19. 
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Family Demography in the 
Post-Covid Era
cLéMentine rossier
in their eFForts to curb the Covid-19 pandemic, many of the world’s govern-
ments restricted the movements and activities of people for several months, 
severely disrupting their daily practices and often cutting them off from 
routine opportunities and resources. Many people adjusted to these losses 
by shifting goals, tapping into alternative resources, and coping as well as 
they could with the collective wave of panic that swept through the media. 
The health crisis also pushed a vulnerable fringe further into dispossession 
and precarity, and the pandemic probably widened psychological and social 
inequalities already present at the population level. 
In fact, Covid-19 acted just like other adverse life events such as illness-
es, divorces, losing one’s job or partner. Demographers know that depend-
ing on their preexisting resource endowments, individuals are not equally 
equipped to cope with crises, and that adverse events have potentially lasting 
effects on socioeconomic conditions and well-being. Even nondisruptive life 
events like union formation entertain strong links with inequalities, as better-
endowed individuals find it easier to enter into unions, and are more apt at 
reaping their long-term benefits. 
Demographers have studied life events and their links to different forms 
of inequalities for many decades. In the field of family and reproduction, they 
have recently monitored trends in teenage pregnancies, “digital mating,” civil 
partnerships, higher-order unions, divorce among older adults, LGBT path-
ways to parenthood, twin and triplet births, late motherhood, transition to 
grandparenthood, and so forth, and have examined their relationship with 
socioeconomic conditions and the well-being of different family members. In 
line with the disciplinary canon of demography, they have analyzed the age, 
period, and cohort effects of these events in great detail.
In the post-Covid-19 era, family demographers will probably continue 
doing just that: they will look at the relationships between the health crisis 
and the numerical trends in diverse reproductive events, along with its com-
plex age, period, and cohort impacts. Has the Covid-19 pandemic accelerated 
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the diffusion of new types of family events, such as meeting a partner online? 
Has it increased the incidence of divorce? Have these societal disruptions 
delayed fertility decisions, and will there be a subsequent catch-up process? 
Has access to family planning or abortion services been affected, leading to 
a surge in unplanned pregnancies and births? And will the pandemic have 
scarring effects? That is, will we witness Covid-19 cohorts of confined children 
with a different outlook on life and new demographic behaviors, or Covid-19 
cohorts of young adults lastingly affected by the particular way in which they 
made their first steps into the world of employment or intimate relationships?
But the Covid-19 crisis will perhaps also help push the interdisciplinary 
life course approach more firmly to the center of demography, leading to a 
rethink of the research agenda. A central notion of the life course perspective 
is that the unfolding of individual lives, punctuated by diverse life events, is 
strongly shaped by societal contexts and crises (Elder 1998). The main idea 
of this approach is that society-wide events and conditions have knock-on 
effects for individuals, affecting the ordering and timing of their life events, 
and that (sometimes small) changes can have lasting effects in later life be-
cause of path-dependency, accumulation processes, and turning points. It also 
focuses on the large variations—and the strong interconnectedness—between 
individuals. In other words, the life course perspective provides a blueprint, 
a systematic framework for studying the effects of major crises on individual 
and family life events and for understanding how they tie in with the varied 
dimensions of inequality (Bernardi et al. 2019).
By shifting their gaze toward this interdisciplinary research stream, de-
mographers could integrate more actively some of the latest developments 
in the sociology and psychology of the life course. Like sociologists, they 
could pay attention to age effects as a manifestation of socially constructed 
age norms and institutions, as they do for gender differences (Levy and Büh-
lmann 2017). They could examine life events as potential watersheds where 
individuals move into paths of upward or downward social mobility, through 
gatekeeping and social reproduction processes (Buchmann and Steinhoff 
2017). Demographers could simultaneously examine these life trajectories 
from the perspective of developmental psychology (Baltes et al. 2007) or 
through the lens of aging processes (Cullati et al. 2018). They could integrate 
these different disciplinary streams by turning to agency-within-structure 
meta-theories, where collective expectations and constraints confront indi-
viduals’ sense of self and aspirations. 
While the notion of identity has been a popular junction point for soci-
ologists since Giddens, and while the Theory of Conjectural Action for fertil-
ity and family change (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011) convincingly elaborates 
upon the interplay between structures and individual-level circumstances, 
such constructions can still be extended at the inner-individual level. I was 
especially convinced by the integration of elements of the psychology of 
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motivation in life course research (Heckhausen and Buchmann 2019). This 
theoretical approach delves deeper into the (non)integration of social norms 
and values by individuals in the form of personal goals; it documents the con-
ditions in the immediate environment (autonomy, affiliation, competence) 
that are needed by individuals to set and pursue goals maximizing their emo-
tional well-being and other outcomes (Deci and Ryan 2008).
By widening the theoretical basis of life course processes from an in-
terdisciplinary perspective, demographers would shift their attention to the 
resources and obstacles of all kinds that determine how individuals manage 
(or not) to deal with both society-wide crises like the Covid pandemic, and 
disruptive family events. In this perspective, family demographers could 
take a fresh look at family forms (often studied rather descriptively as conse-
quences of family events) by considering them as sets of relational constraints 
and resources. They could ask how family relations are different in this regard 
compared to other close relationships, which would extend their reach into 
the study of extra-household and subjectively defined family forms (Widmer 
et al. 2013; Seltzer 2019). Different types of exchanges (care, socioeconomic, 
social influence, symbolic) and practices (sexuality, reproduction, cohabita-
tion, cultural transmission, rites and rituals, and so forth) inherent to family 
ties across a diverse range of network members could be tracked more sys-
tematically. The relational adaptation of individuals and their changing inner 
circles could also be studied more fully using longitudinal study designs. The 
extent to which life events in other domains (residential mobility, working 
career, and so forth) lead to turnover of close and family relations could be 
examined in more depth. Other possible topics include the role of extended 
kinship ties and other weak relations in providing reservoirs of close relations, 
and the impact of spatiality, information, communication, and mobility tech-
nology on all of the above. Thanks to this additional knowledge, the role of 
families as matrices of resources or constraints for coping (or failing to cope) 
with various crises could be examined more thoroughly.
These advances would help demographers participate more actively in 
the discussion on indicators of human welfare used as governance tools at 
both national and international levels (the Sustainable Development Goals, 
for example). With the move away from income as the sole indicator of suc-
cess, other markers of quality of life gained ground, including life expectancy 
and education in the early 1990s (the Human Development Index), followed 
by other measures of population health, including subjective or emotional 
well-being as stated in Goal 3 of the SDGs. Indicators of social affiliation (nota-
bly measures of potential support and of social participation) now also feature 
on the latest dashboards, especially in wealthier nations. In the framework of 
these discussions, family demographers should be in a position to contribute 
their expertise on the measure of meaningful relationships; shifting their at-
tention to families not only as forms but as sets of resources and constraints 
should help them do just that.
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This issue brings us to another point: sustainable human welfare. While 
health crises like the Covid-19 pandemic may have temporarily overshad-
owed concerns about the deterioration of our physical environment by 
suddenly depriving people of their routine resources, it also prefigures the 
changes that will probably be needed to bring individual consumption into 
line with planetary limits. Gaining in-depth knowledge of how individuals 
function well in constrained environments, including by relying more, or 
differently, on relational resources, will be a key research area for the next 
decade. This is probably a factor behind the current interest in subjective (or 
emotional) well-being in the social sciences in general, and also in family de-
mography. Indeed, rather than aiming at ever longer lives or greater wealth, 
which all come with major societal and environmental costs, putting “well-
being” for all at the core of governance may be the only way to engage the 
transition toward sustainability (Gough 2017). 
In a first book on human need published in 1991 with the philosopher 
Len Doyal, Ian Gough (Doyal and Gough 1991), a social policy specialist, ar-
gued that societies should strive to provide a minimum level of intermediary 
needs satisfaction to all (civil rights, nutrition, shelter, protection, health care, 
education, significant others, decent work, and so forth), which in turn will 
allow them to maximize their current physical and mental health (basic hu-
man needs). As opposed to Maslow’s crude theory, this frame does not posit 
a hierarchy of needs (none has to be met first): the distinction introduced 
simply reflects a specific localization, basic needs satisfaction occurring at the 
inner individual level and intermediary needs satisfaction through individu-
als’ interactions with their immediate environment. 
Moreover, while needs are arguably universal, Doyal and Gough (1991) 
stress that the ways to satisfy them are eminently context-specific. Gough 
(2017) links human need satisfaction to sustainability: to him, focusing on 
minimally satisfying these intermediary needs for all—while a colossal chal-
lenge for humanity—will help in implementing the structural changes needed 
to drastically curb environmentally demanding practices among wealthier 
countries and social groups while promoting social justice. Here, well-being 
(basic need satisfaction) acts as a central yardstick, as a high level of well-being 
can be maintained in the long-term even when limiting nonsustainable con-
sumption; but the needed conditions—collective representations and publicly 
provided services probably play a key role—remain to be elucidated. Family 
demographers may have much to say about the role of relational resources 
and social participation in bringing about change in consumption patterns 
and in making up for the decline in environmentally costly activities involved 
in the production of well-being.
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Covid-19 and the Opportunity for 
a Demographic Research Reset
ZeBa sathar
the covid-19 pandeMic has unalterably changed the world. We are repeatedly 
told that things will never return to where they were and we must prepare 
to embrace the “new normal.” For demographers, too, there is a need to 
remain relevant and responsive to the new realities. Many of us who have 
worked on analyzing mortality and fertility trends leading to the completion 
of the demographic transition may need to reexamine these trends in light 
of emerging new demographic norms and behaviors. 
The year 2021 can be seen as an opportunity for demographic research 
to be bolder and for broadening the canvas of our work. It may be an oppor-
tune time to collaborate with other disciplines to tackle social policy, climate 
change, and political economy discourses where we have remained on the 
fringes. There is an opportunity for demographers to become more relevant 
and for the discipline to establish its centrality in the post-Covid world. 
Several areas come to mind for the short-, medium-, and long-term de-
mographic research agenda, both during and after the Covid-19 crisis. In the 
immediate term, during the Covid-19 peak period, demographers must join 
the study of the impact of the pandemic and be part of the solution, helping 
to tackle the pandemic, certainly in middle- and lower-income countries. 
Demographers can contribute to sharpening the policy response by helping 
to understand the spread and impact of the virus, and devise strategies for its 
containment. They can complement and strengthen epidemiological efforts by 
leveraging demographic tools and approaches for data collection and analysis. 
While epidemiologists provide data on the incidence of Covid cases, deaths, 
and positivity rates, demographers have expertise on population distributions 
and densities to estimate the spread and estimate who is most affected, how 
many are likely to get infected, and the impact in terms of changing death 
and birth rates.
In particular, it is important to lead on the challenge of how ongoing 
data collection can be used to build evidence concerning the pandemic. How 
can we use demographic surveillance better? Where can we be strategic and 
Zeba Sathar, Population Council.
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piggyback additional questions onto ongoing surveys? And how can we create 
longitudinal panels to study long-term cross-generation effects?  
A conventional demographic area where we can make immediate con-
tributions is projections concerning the demographic effects of disruption in 
health services. In May 2020, when UNICEF projected that 29 million new 
babies would be born in the next nine months, the majority in South Asia,  it 
was big news! However, it is the responsibility and domain of demographers 
to point out what is usual and what is unusual in the above example, to con-
textualize the number projected by UNICEF through comparison with the 
number that would have been born under normal scenarios. We should be 
ahead of the curve, predicting a rise in births due to higher conception rates 
due to lockdown or a rise in unwanted pregnancies due to the disruption in 
access to contraception services. 
Another topic that has received much attention is how closing and dis-
ruption of regular outpatient departments and nonemergency services might 
increase risks of maternal and child deaths in particular. Demographers can 
certainly contribute to the accuracy of the health and mortality projections 
being used. 
A more challenging and less conventional area of research will be for 
demographers to get involved in the crucial debates about the effect of lock-
down in reducing death rates versus its cost for livelihoods during Covid. 
One of the major tensions across the world is when and whether to allow the 
full relaxation of shutdowns as the pandemic goes through its several waves 
and how this affects economic recovery. Currently, this is almost entirely the 
domain of economists, but we can certainly challenge some of the theories 
being promoted.
In political terms, a relaxation of lockdown is presented as a means to 
permit the working classes and the poor to eke out a living. But this is often 
being done at the potential cost of thousands of people being exposed to the 
infection and potentially thousands of preventable deaths. The perspective 
that shutdowns would have a huge economic cost in low-income countries 
that might far outweigh health benefits is illustrated in a study by two Yale 
researchers that caught the attention of those in the highest echelons of politi-
cal discussions in South Asia.  The other point of view, mainly spearheaded 
by public health and other less powerful groups, focuses on the dangers of 
lifting lockdowns and putting millions of voiceless, faceless workers outside 
their homes at high risk of death. Demographers have been largely absent 
from this discussion but need to contribute in assessing the probabilities and 
alternative projections of how many, if any, would die from the economic 
effects of the lockdown, as against those who would die by coming in contact 
with the Covid-19 infection. 
Migration has not attracted as much attention as mortality and fertility. 
This will need to change as several of the major influences on population 
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growth and distribution post Covid will be international migration flows. 
Several future scenarios of movement and displacements of populations have 
emerged as a result of the Covid pandemic In particular, international migra-
tion flows and streams are likely to be altered. Movement across borders will 
undoubtedly become more restricted. The crash in the travel industry, which 
epitomized the benefits of globalization and international connectedness, also 
bodes ill for international movement, including migration. 
Demographers need to capture the new realities and gauge their 
economic-demographic consequences. Migration will affect livelihoods and 
compositions of populations in the recipient countries, including the United 
States, Europe, and the Middle East, which have relied on in-migration as an 
important component of labor supply and source of innovation. And for the 
sending countries in the low- and middle-income economies, remittances—
often the backbone of livelihoods—are likely to take a nosedive. An area even 
more neglected but of rising importance in contexts like India is internal mi-
gration. Once more, millions of internal migrants are likely to be affected as 
flows stall due to the concentration of the Covid-19 threat in urban centers. 
Covid-19 will have other, related long-term effects on people’s life tra-
jectories, across the world. Living arrangements along with work are likely to 
change, with a direct bearing on familial and intergenerational relationships. 
Marriages and cohabitation may be delayed and ultimately childbearing will 
be affected by new ground rules about child-rearing and care of the elderly 
and sick. There is a potential scope for interdisciplinary research to examine 
these multilevel impacts of Covid-19.
Women’s and girl’s empowerment and gender relations and family re-
sponsibilities and roles, in particular, need to be revisited. Prior research in 
these important areas must be revived to study how shocks such as Covid-19 
are likely to affect the lives and status of women and girls. Can we expect 
familial and gender relationships to be renegotiated in the long term? Is there 
a possibility of a recalibration of gender-related values and restrictions that 
may enable women and girls to gain autonomy and power? 
As part of the reset, we demographers will do well to broaden our field 
to focus on class, regional, and other inequalities, and study social policy 
responses to rising threats and their implications. Through our strength as 
data-driven scientists, there is a chance to weigh in on important debates. We 
ought to join in the movement to improve the societies and world we live in. 
Post-Covid, there will be an opportunity to evaluate countries on the basis 
of whether they considered this challenge an opportunity to reassess public 
health systems, social safety nets, and social justice. The choice is between a 
society driven by the concentration of power and money for a few, or health 
and decent life for all, a society where every life counts. 
Using this challenge of a reset of societal values as a premise or frame-
work, we could start framing the task of building a more egalitarian society 
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where there is no tolerance for inequalities. Given that many other scientists 
in realms such as history, economics, sociology, public health, and political 
science are also studying this pandemic and its social responses, we should 
ask: What is demography’s comparative advantage and unique position? 
Demographers can research whether states that provide basic social services 
fared better in their response to Covid than others that abdicate the basic 
responsibility for health and education. We could contribute to the research 
on the impacts on the poorest and other excluded populations and how so-
cial safety nets can best be structured to ensure that these groups are able to 
sustain shocks such as Covid-19, now and in the future. 
Demographers, working with other disciplines but retaining their niche 
with numbers and analytical tools like projections, can ensure that we are not 
just left with the hortatory language of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). In practical terms, demographers are best equipped to give tangible 
shape to many of the interrelated SDGs. Environment and climate change 
are an important part of the SDGs and an emerging area is the intersection of 
climate change and vulnerability of the populations most exposed. Climate 
change research has been quite limited in incorporating the actual numbers 
and characteristics of those who are most vulnerable and whose lives and 
livelihoods will need adaptation, and are most likely to be directly affected. 
These are some of the interlinkages on which the new generation of demog-
raphers must lead.  
Lastly, the reset for demographers beyond Covid-19 extends to questions 
about our normative assumptions about what the end of history (progress) 
in demographic transition looks like for fertility, mortality, and migration. 
Demographic transition theory is based on a progression of societies from high 
to low fertility and mortality. But what if these were not the natural end of de-
mographic history? Can Covid-19 force us to rethink demographic theories? 
Could demographic transitions include waves of reverse migration, upturns 
in mortality, and increases in fertility in the face of Covid-like pandemics and 
diseases? The expectation of the new normal for demographers should entail 
both internal reflection and outward transformation of the field. 
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Demography Beyond the Foot
jenny trinitapoLi
When john graunt wrote about the plague in 1687, he understood that mor-
tality statistics have an importance beyond the task of counting. He noted that 
“…most of them who constantly took in the weekly Bills of Mortality made 
little other use of them than to look at the foot how the burials increased or 
decreased [emphasis added].” It is a stark visual, the foot. I thought about 
that visual in a new way in February 2020, while teaching Graunt to 18 un-
dergraduates, crowded around a table designed for 15. Although I had read 
Graunt’s Observations multiple times before, that “foot” struck a different 
chord this time. In the context of a mysterious disease circulating and the 
ominous knowledge that any airborne virus could not be contained to a par-
ticular geography, that foot conjured corpse rather than metaphor. 
In the months since, I have thought frequently about John Graunt toil-
ing away by candlelight to convert 50+ years of weekly tabulations of bap-
tisms and burials into something orderly that could reveal statistical regulari-
ties of mortality. Reflecting on what kind of work demographers need to be 
doing now, and in the decades ahead, I see two giant boulders our field needs 
to collectively move, and they are not so different from those Graunt started 
to roll. The first is technical, about the present, and focused on measurement: 
it is a hymn of praise to the good estimate and a valorization of the indispens-
able work of counting well. The second is more intellectual; it concerns the 
future, specifically what will need to be researched in the next 5 to 50 years.
Let us consider first the urgent task: counting to create a clear account of 
the present. Now, some 350 years after Graunt, our vital registration systems 
remain patchwork, incomplete, and flawed; our cause-of-death declarations 
are politicized and imprecise; and these Covid-19 test-positivity rates are 
guesswork, at best. Nonetheless, we are awash in data, with dozens of Co-
vid-19 dashboards and apps to choose from. Some are calling Covid-19 our 
first “data-driven pandemic.” 
A population perspective is crucial for enumerating our current crisis 
and ensuring the quality of our estimates. Demographers need to keep beating 
the same drum we always beat: principles of representative sampling, careful 
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definition of the population at-risk, and correspondence between numerator 
and denominator. Test-positivity rates are a terrible foundation for any kind 
of inference. Sentinel surveillance programs have not and will not generate 
reliable estimates of prevalence or incidence. We learned from the AIDS crisis 
that HIV prevalence could not be proxied by clinical case studies or data from 
antenatal checkups; we relied on those estimates for too long, and when the 
global community finally transitioned to a population-based perspective, we 
discovered that seroprevalence was far lower than previously estimated. The 
mortality burden we had understood as a reflection of 30 percent prevalence 
was actually the consequence of a force much smaller in quantity but more 
potent in fatality. 
A year into the Covid-19 crisis, we have a better handle on case-fatality 
ratios and death rates than we did for HIV after 20 years. We have rapid tests 
and sophisticated models but still too few population-based studies. Political 
leaders across the globe are making major policy decisions without the ben-
efit of basic parameters like age-specific prevalence or a clear and consistent 
community-level incidence rate. Whether to attribute this failure to a lack of 
resources, a difference in perspective between demographic principles and the 
habits of clinical research, or a lack of leadership from demographers remains 
unclear. I venture that Graunt would be amused by our elaborate tools for 
displaying data and appalled to see us relying on data plagued by many of the 
same, irresolvable, interpretive issues that he confronted. The trustworthy 
denominator is a thing worth fighting for; demographers would do well to 
get behind the clear and simple message that we cannot safely navigate this 
pandemic—or future ones—without population-based estimates generated 
from representative samples.
In the short-run, I expect that the widely circulating facts about Co-
vid-19 will continue to focus on quantities: in particular, the daily case count, 
the test-positivity rate, hospitalizations, and the daily and cumulative mor-
tality burden. A key lesson from the first 12 months of Covid-19 is that the 
work of generating sound estimates should not be dismissed as mere count-
ing. If anything, this abundance of new data sources reinforces old lessons 
from earlier plagues: that vital statistics are difficult to keep, especially so in 
an emergency. 
Our Covid dashboards operate on a second level, unrelated to quantities; 
they fuel what I call population chatter. Graunt wrote that the Bills of Mortal-
ity were, for most, merely “a text to talk upon.” And talk, we do. At dinner 
tables and among WhatsApp groups across the globe, the daily and weekly 
Covid numbers provide fodder for everyday conversation, and the numbers 
never speak for themselves. Through population chatter—ongoing conversa-
tions with socially salient others about demographic phenomena (including 
but not limited to mortality rates)—individuals and families weigh evidence, 
narrate the trade-offs between acceptable versus unacceptable risks, make 
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personal decisions about how to protect their families and communities, and 
process unthinkable losses. 
Demographers must counter the characterization of Covid-19 as “dif-
ferent” in some fundamental way because of the vast amount of data at our 
fingertips. People living through this moment do not experience the world 
by weekly rates; they perceive mortality risk through the experiences of their 
own social network. When ordinary people engage in population chatter, 
they are arguing about causation, assigning blame, distinguishing good deaths 
from bad deaths, and assessing the overall risk environment. Through our 
narration of the deaths we observe and the illness that preceded them, our 
conversations about Covid are moralized and politicized, as was the case with 
AIDS, with the 1918 influenza, with the cholera outbreaks of the nineteenth 
century, and by Graunt, who asked whether new reigns of kings brought 
with them new plagues. We are, just as they were, living through a season 
of confusion that will be resolved, not by facts alone, but by facts organized 
through the cognitive and moral frames we build to make sense of it all. 
The other challenge before us concerns what to research next. Taking 
a page from the best examples of historical demography and demographic 
history, it is safe to say that the imprint of a major disease event will be mani-
fest not only in those who die from the novel coronavirus but in the lives of 
those who survive, in the institutions that crumble and those that persist, 
and in the cultural practices and social norms that endure and adapt. In other 
words, it may not be the increase in mortality—the Malthusian oscillation of 
2020/21—that commands our attention in the long run. As with other major 
historical epidemics, we will need to analyze Covid-19 as a test of our social 
and political structures. 
Demographers need to contribute, of course, to a first wave of research 
(and this is already under way) that specifies the immediate effects of Co-
vid-19 on mortality, morbidity, and bereavement with an emphasis on in-
equality. Getting this right is hugely important; it will be controversial and 
politically consequential. This is the corpse-part of mortality research—the 
foot as foot. Count, classify, compare, repeat ad infinitum. To the extent that 
our research can both expose and address the fault lines of inequality that 
structure contemporary populations, this work may be more moral reckoning 
than estimation problem.
A second wave of demographic research will look beyond mortality and 
address the immediate consequences of Covid-19 for family life at both the 
micro- and macro-levels. Graunt pondered the difference between burials 
and christenings; we will inquire about nuptiality and divorce rates, age-
specific fertility rates, and family structure. To elaborate just one example, the 
consequences for fertility will be manifest in volitional and biological path-
ways. Among women aged 25–45 across Covid-affected contexts, I expect to 
see immediate changes through fertility reductions and delays. We will not 
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be surprised to observe lengthening birth intervals among parents of small 
children who lack reliable childcare during Covid times—a household-level 
response. Some reductions will be volitional, due to economic precarity or 
a lack of extended-family support, while others will be biological as a result 
of postponement: when women nearing the end of their reproductive lives 
delay, they may end up having “chosen” to reduce. Because demographers 
are concerned with the way the whole of a population looks, we may see a 
renewed attentiveness to age-structure and the multigenerational impact of 
Covid disruptions in a life-course framework, the consequences of which will 
play out over decades, not years. 
Perhaps the most important suggestion for thinking beyond the foot is 
present in Graunt’s seldom-mentioned subtitle to The Observations: “With 
reference to the Government, Religion, Growth, Ayre, Diseases, and the 
several Changes of Said City.” Thinking beyond the foot requires us to link 
our knowledge of mortality and morbidity burdens, in particular, to some 
questions of ultimate concern. The consequences of Covid-19 as a disease 
event will bring changes to our religious rituals, burial rites, our routines of 
food preparation, and ethics of obligation to kin, to neighbors coping with 
long-term morbidities, and to the earth. Here, we must venture outside of 
conventional demographic territory to start and sustain conversations with 
adjacent disciplines and subfields; such exchange may bring new opportuni-
ties to export and enrich demographic knowledge and approaches. 
Take religious rituals and doctrines: Christians across the globe cannot 
safely gather in their parishes to sing beloved hymns and drink from a shared 
cup right now. Virtual Islamic platforms are sustaining daily and weekly 
prayers while observing social-distancing recommendations. New funeral 
rites, religious and secular, including the drive-through-wake and Zoom shiva 
are emerging before our eyes. Young people are improvising expressions of 
collective grief that combine a new understanding of universal precautions 
with the nonnegotiable elements of their parents’ rituals. All of this can be 
productively analyzed within a framework of demographic change, and a 
keen ear to population chatter may help us solve some puzzles about which 
things change and which stay the same in the wake of this pandemic. 
While religious practices are often thought of as settled or fixed, previ-
ous research from a population perspective shows that religious teachings 
and practices are dynamic and responsive to demographic realities. Specific 
rituals may change quickly, but the consensus positions to justify them un-
fold over longer periods of time; these tend to be organized around an ethos 
(e.g., healthfulness and stability to promote social reproduction in families 
and communities) rather than articulated as a set of practical concerns. We 
are hearing critiques of the built environment and calls to reform our parks, 
roads, public restrooms, apartment buildings, hospitals, and schools in the 
interest of hygiene and health, religious and secular. These critiques echo 
72  d e M o g r a p h y  B e y o n d  t h e  F o o t
choruses of social-gospel-style reform from the Progressive Era. For social 
gospelers, managing plague required scientific knowledge, the reparation of 
broken social relationships, and the creation of new safety-nets and structures 
of care. A scientifically informed project of social redemption to address the 
casualties of Covid is imminent, and while it may not be explicitly religious 
or unified, its underpinnings will be moral, particular, and contested. 
I’ll make these points again in February 2021, when I teach Graunt to 
19-year-olds—this time masked and distanced in an awkwardly oversized 
classroom. Good estimates are worth toiling over, and the residue of Co-
vid-19 will not be confined to the demographic sphere. The ordinary work 
of enumeration, classification, and comparison is, in some fundamental way, 
a moral project, and the religious and political transformations that seem, to 
many, like acts of divine revelation may have a more prosaic explanation: 
demographic change. What a profound paradox we find in that foot.
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Implications of the Covid-19 
Pandemic for Economic and 
Demographic Research
FranK-Borge WietZKe 
as We are entering the second or even third wave of Covid-19 infections, much 
research is still needed to assess the true global health impacts and death toll of 
the pandemic. This applies in particular to low- and middle-income countries, 
where testing and diagnostic capacities are still often rudimentary. What we can 
say with certainty is that the economic consequences of Covid-19 are dramatic. 
This note therefore concentrates on the socioeconomic dimensions of the pan-
demic, and specifically their possible interactions with demographic behaviors. I 
focus on developing regions, where populations are often most heavily affected. 
Covid-19: A Magnifier of Preexisting Weaknesses and 
Vulnerabilities
Across the global South, preventive and containment measures have disrupted 
labor and product markets and imposed high economic costs on the local popula-
tion. This was accompanied by rapidly contracting fiscal space, as governments 
scrambled to mobilize scarce resources for (often piecemeal) emergency inter-
ventions. The magnitude and consequences of these developments cannot be 
understated. At the global level, the Covid-19 pandemic has reversed previous 
trends toward diminishing between-country inequalities, as capacities for effec-
tive monetary and fiscal responses diverge sharply between the developed and 
developing world. Within developing countries (as well as developed ones), the 
pandemic has accelerated widening income gaps and social disparities among 
the population.1
Covid hit low- and middle-income nations at a time when—despite often 
rapid growth and poverty reduction over the past decades—the situation for 
vast parts of the population was still precarious. Global poverty at the “extreme” 
purchasing power-adjusted $1.90 poverty line stood at an estimated 9.2 percent 
before the pandemic. However, this disguised important variation between 
countries and regions. In less-developed continents like sub-Saharan Africa, na-
tional extreme poverty head counts averaged 40 percent and absolute numbers 
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of extreme poor were either stagnant or declining only slowly, once changes in 
underlying population sizes were taken into account (World Bank 2020).2 In 
addition, tens of millions of those who had escaped poverty were still in eco-
nomically insecure circumstances. Even small idiosyncratic shocks, such as a 
short-term loss in income or a health emergency, could push these households 
back into extreme poverty (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014). 
These shocks have, of course, been magnified and generalized by the 
pandemic. In many developing countries, lockdown measures and economic 
contraction have deprived especially those in informal or precarious forms of 
employment of their main sources of income. By some estimates, these effects 
could raise the global poverty head count at the $1.90 poverty line by up to 6 
percentage points (Sumner, Hoy, and Ortiz-Juarez 2020). This situation was only 
partially mitigated by government interventions. Although many countries put 
in place social assistance programs, these were often short-term and accompa-
nied by reduced access to basic services, as lockdowns limited users’ ability to 
reach facilities. Large-scale debt relief or rapid increases in development assis-
tance withstanding, we should expect government responses to contract further, 
as public budgets in many emerging economies remain under severe stress.3
Consequences for Demographic Research 
What are the implications for demographic research? We know from previ-
ous studies that, individually, households’ coping strategies can affect various 
parameters that matter to demographic outcomes and reproductive behavior, 
such as reductions in spending on health care, contraceptives, or girls’ education 
(Skoufias 2003). These economic adjustments are magnified by the social costs 
and gendered impacts of the pandemic itself. During the Covid-19 crisis—as in 
previous years—women bear most of the responsibility for childcare, elder care, 
and housework, while simultaneously providing the bulk of the workforce in 
the local public health response (Cousins 2020; Hall et al. 2020). 
Simultaneously, lockdown measures and increased financial pressures 
on governments and charities have disrupted access to women’s sexual and 
reproductive health and prenatal and postnatal care. Experiences with past 
humanitarian crises have shown that such sudden disruptions to health supply 
can result in growing rates of unintended pregnancies, increased child and in-
fant mortality, as well as a broad range of other reproductive and mental health 
problems (McGinn 2000). 
These widespread shocks may undo decades of progress in advancing 
gender equality, reproductive health, or even the structural shift toward lower 
fertility in many developing countries. Learning about the extent of these prob-
lems, as well as the appropriate policy responses, will require more integrated 
research at the interface of economics and social demography. I focus here on 
three interlinked questions. 
First, as long as evidence about the on-the-ground health and economic 
impacts of the crisis remains patchy in many countries, more systematic analy-
sis will be needed to determine which populations and subgroups were most 
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affected. These assessments should be based on more robust and representative 
data sources than were so far (typically) available during the pandemic, and pay 
particular attention to interactions between household coping responses and 
impacts on gender, health, and demographic outcomes, as described above. 
Second, and adopting a longer-term view, more research is needed to study 
effects of deteriorating gender and socioeconomic indicators on household- and 
group-specific fertility outcomes. The purpose of this analysis would be to iden-
tify possible divergence in reproductive behaviors that could point to delayed or 
even reversed fertility transitions for countries or parts of the population. Useful 
templates would be provided by previous disaggregated research that tried to 
identify population- or subgroup-specific drivers of lower-than-average fertil-
ity reductions in developing regions like sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America 
(Bongaarts and Casterline 2013; Bongaarts 2017; Rios-Neto, Miranda-Ribeiro, 
and Miranda-Ribeiro 2018; Wietzke 2020). 
Finally, the particular nature of the crisis should be recognized as an op-
portunity to question some of the more established indicators and subgroup clas-
sifications that are often used to proxy for socioeconomic contexts in the analysis 
of local demographic behaviors. For example, while the validity of binary urban-
rural classifiers was already put in question by the rapid growth of intermediary 
peri-urban areas in many developing regions (Mbiba and Huchzermeyer 2002; 
Karg et al. 2019), the use of rural identifiers as a stand-in for generalized socio-
economic disadvantage has come under further scrutiny, as impacts of the crisis 
are often concentrated among urban populations (World Bank 2020). Future 
changes in lifestyles and production patterns while countries move through the 
crisis and into recovery may require further reconsideration of these categories. 
Where will the data for these analyses come from? In the medium- to 
long-term, the bulk of systematic and representative studies of Covid-19 impacts 
will be provided by the usual sources, such as government statistics, population 
censuses, or nationally representative household surveys. However, these typi-
cally arrive with long time lags and at infrequent intervals and may be further 
delayed by local responses to the pandemic. It is thus unlikely that they will allow 
particularly up-to-date or fine-grained over-time analysis of Covid-19 impacts 
in the near future. 
In these contexts, it may be necessary to also think about possible alterna-
tive data sources. For instance, in the field of economic poverty and vulnerability 
analysis, researchers often rely on high-frequency telephone surveys to track the 
effects of Covid-19 and previous economic crises. These often include rudimen-
tary modules on health and demographic behaviors (or could be enriched by 
such modules), that would permit more up-to-date analysis of the crisis impacts 
in areas of interest to demographers.4
Regardless of the actual tools used, new pragmatic and often-interdisciplin-
ary approaches will be needed to better understand the evolution of socioeco-
nomic inequalities and demographic responses, as societies move through, and 
hopefully eventually emerge from, the pandemic. 




inequality. Last accessed August 11, 2020.
2 Estimates are for 2017 and adjusted for 
local purchasing power differences. 
3 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
GFSR/Issues/2020/10/13/global-financial-
stability-report-october-2020. Last accessed 
August 11, 2020.
4 See, for example, https://www.world-
bank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/high-fre-
quency-monitoring-surveys. Last accessed 
August 11, 2020. Dabalen et al. 2016. 
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Covid-19: A Tsunami That 
Amplifies Existing Trends in 
Demographic Research
eMiLio Zagheni
WhiLe diFFerent Waves of Covid-19 have reached different shores at differ-
ent times, and the intensity of the consequences have been felt unequally, 
everyone has been affected in some ways. The pandemic has been a major 
public health crisis, but the long-lasting effects of this disruptive force will also 
touch upon many more aspects of our lives and reshape priorities for research. 
During crises, some commonly held beliefs are questioned and scrutinized. 
While core principles weather the storm, opportunities to build new and bet-
ter infrastructure and practices emerge. 
In this note, I argue that the pandemic will also be remembered as a wa-
tershed moment for demographic research, and the point of rapid acceleration 
of already existing trends in population studies. These include: rethinking the 
temporal and spatial scale at which population processes operate; combining 
heterogeneous data sources, including privately owned ones, with solid sta-
tistical methods and research design; and assessing the growing importance of 
digital connections for social and generational relationships and as determi-
nants of health and inequalities. More broadly, the pandemic has highlighted 
strengths, as well as revealed inadequacies, in our theoretical understanding 
of demographic processes, and represents a unique opportunity for theoretical 
advances in the discipline.   
At the foundation of modern demographic research lies the belief that 
population processes unfold slowly and in fairly predictable ways. Regularities 
in demographic rates by age, sex, and over time are what makes medium-
range forecasts possible (Lee and Carter 1992; Schmertmann et al. 2014). The 
relative smoothness of demographic rates also informs the type of collection, 
processing, and distribution of data that happens at national statistical offices 
and international organizations. Most population statistics are produced at 
the country level, for one- or five-year periods, and are often published with 
substantial delays. The pandemic has forced us to rethink the temporal and 
spatial scales at which demography operates. As weekly excess deaths have 
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become one of the key metrics of impact of the pandemic across countries 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020), statistical 
offices quickly adjusted to address new needs. Overnight, demography went 
from “slow” to “fast” mode as more and more statistical offices reported time 
series of weekly deaths, in some cases disaggregated by age and sex, or at the 
subnational level. This rapid response will have long-lasting consequences on 
how demographers think about the time scale of population processes, and 
the type of data they produce and use. 
Data with high temporal and spatial resolution have always been of 
interest to demographers. For example, highly granular data are important 
for assessing seasonality in demographic events (Dorélien 2016), the impact 
of natural disasters on mortality (Zagheni et al. 2015), the potential role of 
climate change on migration (Hauer 2017), or the consequences of conflict 
for fertility (Fargues 2000). Today, we have reached a level of interest in 
high-resolution data that we have never seen before. The scale of interest and 
relevance has moved from local settings to a global context. I believe that we 
are at a tipping point: as more and more institutions have invested resources 
in producing and releasing weekly mortality reports, and as network effects 
put pressure on institutions that have not been ready to adapt yet, we will see 
more and more timely dissemination of death records. This direction will also 
set a path beyond mortality statistics, and for countries that still have to de-
velop capacity to meet current and future needs. This is not only momentum: 
it is a corollary of the fact that demographic measures, including mortality, 
fertility, and migration rates, have been recognized as important indicators of 
the state of our societies. For example, data compiled by the United Nations 
Population Division underpin about a third of the indicators used for moni-
toring the sustainable development goals globally.1 The growing importance 
of demographic data that are timely, highly granular, and open will serve as a 
rising tide for the whole discipline of demography. As more granular data will 
become available, more opportunities will emerge for solid causal analyses 
that will invigorate the field and strengthen demographic theory. 
Established demographic data sources, like censuses, registers, and 
probabilistic surveys, are the polar star for population scientists and anchor 
demographers’ orientation. However, in a growing number of cases, these 
sources are not enough to address today’s challenges. The pandemic highlight-
ed the increasing importance of data innovation, privately held infrastructure, 
and passively collected data. Web giants like Google, Facebook, and Apple 
have produced and maintained detailed aggregate-level geographic mobility 
reports, which are useful to assess, among others, the effect of nonpharma-
ceutical interventions on the spread of the pandemic (Ruktanonchai et al. 
2020) and on mortality (Basellini et al. 2020). Online measurement compa-
nies for marketers, like Cuebiq, have made anonymous location data collected 
via apps available to researchers, as part of their “Data for Good” program. 
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Some of these data have been used to calibrate epidemiological models (Pepe 
et al. 2020). Facebook ran a large-scale survey of its users to study Covid-19 
symptoms, while demographers have used Facebook’s advertisement plat-
form to recruit survey participants (Perrotta et al. 2020). This explosion in 
data availability, as well as in the use of new types of tools and infrastructure 
for data collection, have highlighted challenges and opportunities ahead. On 
the one hand, in a crisis context, private companies showed increased will-
ingness to share data responsibly and, to some extent, to shed light on the 
trove of information that is available to them. That said, these data cannot be 
taken at face value because of a number of inherent biases. However, when 
appropriately combined with representative sources and credible statistical 
methods, they become an invaluable asset for demographic research. For 
example, according to the World Health Organization, globally two-thirds 
of deaths are not registered with local authorities.2 While, in the long-term, 
comprehensive registration systems would be the preferable solution, in the 
short- and medium terms, new forms of data collection and indirect methods 
that leverage the infrastructure of the digital age are key. Emerging network-
based approaches for the estimation of demographic quantities (Feehan and 
Cobb 2019) are likely to receive more attention and I expect that the pan-
demic will further spur a new wave of innovative approaches to produce the 
best possible estimates in traditionally data-poor contexts. 
Digital trace data are not the result of the pandemic, but Covid-19 has 
likely changed the perception that companies, scholars, and professional or-
ganizations have of these data, thus opening new opportunities for progress. 
Some of the mixing between industry and academia, along with a realign-
ment of incentives, is likely to have planted the seeds for new forms of joint 
ventures. If appropriate measures are developed to guarantee privacy, data-
protection, and ethical frameworks for the use of digital traces, the pandemic 
may mark a milestone for the rapid acceleration of partnerships between 
scientists and holders of private data and infrastructure. 
The rapid increase in data availability, often referred to as the “data 
revolution,” is only the aftershock of deeper tectonic shifts in the way we live 
and interact with others in the digital age. As of 2019, 81 percent of the adult 
population in the United States owned a smartphone, up from 35 percent in 
2011.3 Worldwide, more than 4 billion people are estimated to use the Inter-
net, up from less than 2 billion people a decade ago.4 The pandemic has forced 
more people to engage more deeply with the digital world, with long-term 
consequences. During lockdowns, communications with colleagues, friends, 
and members of the extended family took a digital form, for those who had 
the skills and resources to access digital technologies. As we tried to make 
sense of the world outside our homes, we turned to Google, Bing, Baidu, or 
alternative search engines. Daily activities like shopping for groceries moved 
online for many people. And so did many other aspects of our lives like at-
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tending lectures in school or college, consulting a physician, holding family 
events, dating, working, filing for unemployment, interviewing for a job, and 
virtually everything that could be moved online. 
As social relationships were forced to become digital, we developed a 
new perception of the online world and its communities. The distinction 
between online and offline has become more blurred. This has important 
consequences for our societies and, as a result, for the research landscape in 
the social sciences. For instance, in public health there have been increased 
calls for fully considering broadband Internet access as a social determinant of 
health (Benda et al. 2020). This is consistent with an emerging line of research 
that aims at assessing the role of changes in information and communication 
technologies on development (Rotondi et al. 2020), demographic indicators 
(Billari et al. 2019), health and well-being (Lohmann and Zagheni 2020), and 
intergenerational relationships (Gil-Clavel and Zagheni 2019; Arpino et al. 
2020). Demographers are uniquely positioned to quantify the demographic 
differential impact of access and use of digital technologies. 
The pandemic is likely accelerating underlying trends in demographic 
research. While this indicates a bright future for population studies, Covid-19 
is also shaking some of the pillars on which the discipline rests and exposing 
some inadequacies of current paradigms. One of the strengths of demogra-
phy is that it relies on unambiguous definitions of the underlying events of 
interest. Births and deaths are clearly identified occurrences. However, most 
demographic measures, like rates, rely also on denominators that include 
population counts or related quantities, like person-years of exposure. These 
denominators are typically derived from concepts like the usual place of resi-
dence, and should account for migration and relocations. While migration is 
already particularly difficult to quantify, the pandemic has further challenged 
our ability to measure usual place of residence, as an increasing number of 
people have started to work remotely and often relocated temporarily to areas 
farther away from the usual workplace, sometimes across political borders. 
Measurement issues related to migration (Deville et al. 2014; Fiorio et al. 
2017) will likely become more central for demography as they are crucial not 
only to understand migration trends, but also to produce accurate estimates 
of fertility and mortality rates, as well as health indicators, at various levels 
of spatial and temporal granularity. 
A perhaps underappreciated strength of demography is that the toolbox 
of formal demographers is key to model and quantify a wide range of popula-
tion issues, from the spread of the virus to the extent of excess deaths, and 
likely scenarios for the future. As a matter of fact, one of the most elegant 
theories of formal demography, the stable population theory, is closely linked 
to compartmental models used in epidemiology, and shares key concepts, like 
the intrinsic population growth rate, which is closely related to the R0, the 
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basic reproduction ratio used in models for the spread of infections. While 
the pandemic reminded the world of the importance of formal demography, 
it also showed how much uncertainty there is about the long-term conse-
quences of this shock on key components of demographic change, like fertility 
(Aassve et al. 2020) and migration (Guadagno 2020, O’Brien and Eger 2020). 
Existing theories provide insights and perspectives, but they remain largely 
fragmented and may lead to quite different conclusions. Major theories in 
demography, like the demographic transition theory, describe moves from 
disorder to stability (Livi-Bacci 2017). However, in contemporary societies 
we often encounter moves from order to disruptions, related to recessions, 
conflicts, famines, natural disasters, technological transformations, pandem-
ics, and more. 
While each shock is unique in some ways, compiling and analyzing dis-
ruptions and their impact on populations could hold the key to reconciling 
existing theories and formulating a synthesis of our understanding of the re-
lationships between discontinuities and demography. One of the long-lasting 
consequences of the pandemic might be an increased awareness that, also 
in the context of demographic theory, we need the whole to become greater 
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The Influence of the Covid-19 
Pandemic on the Study of  
Macro-social Determinants of 
Population Health and Mortality
ZhongWei Zhao
since its outBreaK in Wuhan, China, Covid 19 has spread rapidly throughout 
the world. According to WHO, the number of confirmed cases reached 76.3 
million and deaths 1.7 million globally by December 22, 2020 (WHO 2020). 
Unlike the SARS epidemic that affected about 30 countries and territories 
between late 2002 and early 2004, this pandemic and its aftermath will be 
with us for years. As one of the largest public health crises in human history 
(Goldstein and Lee 2020), the Covid-19 pandemic has profoundly changed 
the world and the lives of billions of people. As demographers what have we 
learned up to the present, and what can we do to improve our research and 
contribute to the war against the pandemic and the enhancement of popula-
tion health?
Demography as an academic discipline began with the study of mortal-
ity when John Graunt’s Natural and Political Observations Made upon the 
Bills of Mortality was published in 1662. (The bills were used initially to track 
potential plague epidemics, and later to record deaths.) This exemplifies how 
the need to control infectious diseases and interest in understanding mortality 
led to the development of demography and related modern sciences (Graunt 
1662; Kreager 2003; Rowland 2003).
The early development of demography was driven largely by the study 
of mortality. Since the late nineteenth century, increasing attention has been 
focused on studies of population growth, fertility, migration, urbanization, 
and population aging (Caldwell 2003). Progress has also been made in the 
investigation of mortality, especially its changes, age patterns, sex differentials, 
and cause structure, as well as increasing longevity. In examining causes of 
mortality decline and their variations, efforts have been made mainly in quan-
titative analysis of the influence of micro-level factors. Impacts of macro-social 
determinants of health and mortality have been overshadowed, although 
there are exceptions (Caldwell 1986; Galea 2007).
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Like Graunt’s examination of the bills of mortality, the Covid-19 pan-
demic and the fight against it will greatly influence demographic research. 
They have, first of all, posed many new challenges and research questions. 
The urgent need to control the pandemic and its wide range of impacts have 
already become a powerful engine driving research development in many 
areas including demography. Furthermore, although it is a great tragedy in 
human history, the pandemic and especially the war against it have provided 
research opportunities that we have rarely seen before. This public health 
crisis has affected almost all countries and territories in the world, subject to 
the influence of varied natural environments and cultural traditions, as well 
as different social, economic, and political systems. Many governments have 
been heavily involved in controlling the pandemic and managing its damage 
and destruction. This new environment allows some crucial questions to be 
studied at an unprecedented scale. There have also been rapid developments 
in data collection and cross-discipline research collaborations. A flood of 
research on Covid-19-related topics has swept websites and journals (Else 
2020, p. 553). With these in mind, I make some comments on the role of 
several macro-social determinants of population health in the fight against 
the pandemic and on how this may influence future development in demo-
graphic research.
Macro-social determinants of population health refer to social condi-
tions that influence population health and mortality at the level of popula-
tions or large subpopulations. They include, for example, governance and 
government policy, social institutions and social structure, and social status 
of vulnerable populations (Galea 2007; WHO 2010). Impacts of macro-social 
determinants on population health and mortality are often indirect (in the 
sense they may not directly change people’s health condition) and via (or 
through influencing) intermediate or intermediary determinants (Putman 
and Galea 2008; WHO 2010). Detailed examinations of influences of macro-
social determinants have been limited in demography, partly due to the dif-
ficulty in quantifying them or disentangling them from other determinants.
A key macro-social determinant of health is governance, which is de-
fined by the UN (UNDESA, UNDP and UNESCO 2012, p. 3) as “the exercise 
of political and administrative authority at all levels to manage a country’s af-
fairs. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet 
their obligations and mediate their differences.” The Covid-19 pandemic is an 
unprecedented test for governance throughout the world. Many national and 
local political and administrative authorities have made considerable efforts in 
managing the public health crisis. But outcomes have not been satisfactory in 
many countries. The spread of Covid-19 has not been contained since its first 
major outbreaks nearly a year ago. Many countries have now experienced 
Z h a o  85
the second and even third wave of infection. The number of daily confirmed 
cases has reached a new high. Of course, the spread of the pandemic has been 
caused by many factors, especially those directly related to the asymptomatic 
infectiousness of the virus, and the limited effectiveness of prevention and 
control. Despite that, it is still important to ask the question of what role has 
been played by governance and other macro-social determinants.
There are significant variations in the effectiveness of controlling Co-
vid-19 and some noteworthy experiences across populations. After it was 
struck severely by the first outbreak in Wuhan between January and March 
2020, for example, China has by and large prevented another major surge 
in Covid-19 infection in a population of 1.4 billion (Leung et al. 2020; WHO 
2020). This is confirmed by at least the following facts. First, hundreds of mil-
lions of Chinese traveled throughout the country during the May Day and 
National Day holiday periods, yet this was not followed by major outbreaks 
of new infection. Second, when China gradually reopened its universities 
after the pandemic was controlled, tens of millions of students returned 
to their classrooms and dormitories without a major increase in Covid-19 
morbidity to date. In contrast, the number of confirmed cases continued to 
grow and reached more than 17.7 million in America between January 20 
and December 22 (WHO 2020). Third, economic recovery in China has been 
speedy. In comparison with 2019, GDP increased by 0.7 percent in the first 
three quarters and 4.9 percent in the third quarter of 2020 (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China 2020). 
The above discussion suggests a close link between governance and 
controlling the pandemic, but many questions about this link remain to be 
answered. For example, in countries struck by the second wave or suffering 
a prolonged outbreak, what is the extent to which these adverse develop-
ments are attributable to governance? What are the major obstacles that 
prevent more desirable governance from being achieved; for example, policies 
and strategies lacking scientific ground, indecisive or delayed actions, poor 
implementation of strategies, failure to obtain public support, or simply de-
ficient resources and capacity? To systematically investigate these questions, 
we need more time and data. Diagnosing the underlying causes of different 
types of failure also requires cross-discipline collaboration. Demographers 
alone may not be able to answers all these questions, but they can make a 
major contribution.
Another macro-social determinant that is closely related to governance 
and demographic research is social institutions. They refer to clusters of 
behavioral rules governing “human actions and relationships in recurrent 
situations” (McNicoll 1994, p. 201), or “a complex, integrated set of social 
norms organized around the preservation of a basic societal value” (Sociol-
ogy Guide 2020). Social institutions often vary across countries. One of their 
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essential features is their persistence, “generating a society’s distinctive pat-
terns of social organizations and the texture of social life” (McNicoll 1994, p. 
201). They also help to define the rights and obligations of the government 
(or state) and citizens as well as their relationship in some societies. These 
make social institutions very relevant to the control of Covid-19 and efforts 
in improving population health.
Improving population health and mortality is largely about interven-
tion. In addition to the development brought about by medical science and 
technology, this includes changing behavior or lifestyle by individuals and 
public health campaigns or programs launched by the government. When 
such actions are led or promoted by the government, what policy options are 
available and whether related intervention strategies can be implemented 
effectively are influenced strongly by social institutions. This is exactly what 
has been happening in the fight against Covid-19.
There were considerable debates on whether people should wear face 
masks when the Covid-19 infection started. Along with the worsening situa-
tion, the debates have also extended to whether border closures, curfews, or 
other stricter restrictions on social contacts and people’s activities are needed 
or acceptable. These disputes arise from not only people’s different knowl-
edge about the necessity of these control measures or strategies, but also their 
contrasting views on whether the national government or local authority 
have the right or should be allowed to force people to accept them. Similarly, 
many governments have developed policies and plans to guide efforts against 
the pandemic, but there were considerable variations in their implementa-
tion across countries. Sometimes, similar policies and plans have led to very 
different results. These are at least partly attributable to the impact of varied 
social institutions and cultural traditions. Thus, tackling Covid-19 is not only 
about searching what is the most effective method to stop the spread of the 
virus, but more important, what is the most effective and acceptable way of 
controlling the infection in a particular population. Just as social institutions 
affected family planning and fertility changes (McNicoll 1980 and 1994), 
the experience of fighting the pandemic confirms that institutional impacts 
of a similar nature also exist in improving population health and lowering 
mortality.
Since the beginning of 2020, close to 200 countries and territories have 
developed policies and strategies to control the spread of Covid-19. Their 
implementation has been documented and analyzed (Hale et al. 2020). These 
provide a unique opportunity for a further investigation into the questions 
discussed above. This could considerably enrich our knowledge about the 
impact of social institutions on policy intervention and improving popula-
tion health.
A further major macro-social determinant of population health is the 
social status of vulnerable populations (or how they are treated in society). 
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In the current pandemic, vulnerable populations mainly refer to people who 
have had greater susceptibility to Covid-19 and experienced more serious 
health consequences after being infected than the population at large, al-
though those prone to the loss of livelihood or with hardship of other kinds 
may also be considered as vulnerable. Their vulnerabilities arise for different 
reasons. For some people, the vulnerabilities are caused by their physiologi-
cal, demographic, or occupational characteristics (e.g., certain health condi-
tions, being old, or having close contact with infected people). For others, 
the vulnerabilities are closely related to social or economic characteristics 
(e.g., refugees, temporary migrant workers, people in poverty or belonging 
to certain ethnic groups), which may considerably affect their social status 
(Andrasfay and Goldman 2020; Sánchez-Páez 2020). Higher Covid-19 in-
cidence and mortality have been observed in some subpopulations during 
the pandemic, especially in its early stage (Koh 2020; Sobotka et al. 2020; 
Steiber and Muttarak 2020). But these subpopulations and their vulnerability 
levels vary notably across countries: due to differences in the level of initial 
preparation for the outbreak of the pandemic, the speed with which vulner-
abilities in certain subpopulations have been identified, or the extent to which 
enhanced protection has been provided to vulnerable populations. Failing to 
help vulnerable people to protect themselves will worsen the socioeconomic 
and health inequalities that had already existed in pre-pandemic times and 
jeopardize the control of Covid-19 in the entire population. Consequences 
of this kind may be less observable in countries with higher levels of social 
equality and good social protection systems, but could be devastating in places 
where millions of people live in slums or a large number of refugees or tem-
porary migrant workers are socially disadvantaged. Accordingly, additional 
efforts in monitoring new epidemiological developments and identifying 
vulnerable populations, and in efficiently controlling the spread of Covid-19 
among them are crucial steps in overcoming the pandemic and further im-
proving population health.
As indicated by many studies, a huge amount of data has been gathered 
since the outbreak of Covid-19, but much has not yet been used for in-depth 
studies of the pandemic, especially for cross-country comparative analysis. 
This is primarily due to the fact that these data have often been collected 
by researchers from different disciplines for different purposes and through 
different procedures. The data (e.g., causes of death, cases of Covid-19) may 
be recorded according to different criteria or subjected to the influence of 
varying registration problems. They therefore need careful documentation, 
evaluation, standardization, harmonization, and perhaps a necessary adjust-
ment before being used more effectively in producing more reliable results. 
This is another area in which demographers and their expertise can make a 
major contribution.
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